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Abstract
Conscientious objection within health care is defined as a refusal to comply with a
medically sanctioned request based on personal moral, or religious moral reasons.
Although conscientious objection is an important foundation in bioethics, most research
has focused on the legitimacy o f its use by individual health care professionals. The
following ethical analysis examines the ethical implications of Catholic hospital
conscientious objections to providing reproductive services to which they are morally
opposed within the context of the Canadian health care system, and more specifically
within rural areas. Conclusions o f the analysis suggest that hospitals do not possess a
conscience according to the dominant view of conscience in bioethics and that limitations
on the objections of Catholic hospitals are warranted in a number of important
circumstances, many of which include rural areas. This analysis will help further the
limited body of knowledge concerning conscientious objections by Catholic hospitals in
Canada and inform future health policy decisions.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Problem Statement & Purpose
In the summer of 2007, the peaceful town of Midland, Ontario, Canada, population
16,000, was unwillingly thrust into the limelight when the reproductive health services on
which they relied were threatened (Gandhi, 2007). Following a year of closed-door
discussions, on June 15, 2007, trustees o f the region’s only two hospitals - Huronia
General Hospital (secular) and Penetanguishene General Hospital (Roman Catholic) not
five kilometers away - voted to merge (Gandhi, 2007). What was troubling to both health
care professionals (HCPs) and community members regarding this merger, however, was
they proposed to do so as a Catholic organization. This would result in the immediate loss
of a number o f reproductive services to the community as well as to the region. As news
o f the merger spread, so did public opposition. Finally, on August 2nd 2007, after
resignations from four Huronia General Board members (including the Chair) and six
physicians from the Huronia District Medical Advisory Council, as well as mounting
■
..
■
. .
. \
protests from the community and surrounding regions, the proposed merger was reversed
(Abortion Rights Coalition of Canada, 2007; Glynn, 2007a, 2007b; “Simcoe county
hospital”, 2007):

'

:: ;

-

.

:

;

,

Although Midland was successful in preserving access to its full complement of
reproductive services, the same cannot be said for others. A case in point was the removal
of tubal ligations from the services provided by St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Humboldt,
Saskatchewan in 2006. This procedure was found to be contrary to the Health Ethics
Guide (Catholic Health Association of Canada [now Catholic Health Alliance o f Canada]
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[CHAC], 2000) and as such was discontinued in the rural community, at first completely
and then after significant public pressure, for birth control purposes only (Yaworski,
2007).

' ’■ •■■■•

•

.

'

'

--

As these cases suggest, while the provision of health care by Catholic hospitals, or
mergers between secular and Catholic hospitals, may seem harmless at first, a closer
examination reveals they can pose significant barriers to accessing certain reproductive
health care services. This is because religious philosophy is allowed to justify refusals to
provide services, therapies, and procedures that contradict their guiding religious values.
Thus the scope o f services offered by Catholic hospitals, as opposed to secular hospitals,
is directed by the doctrine and principles of the Roman Catholic Church, and not always
by medical guidelines or the needs of the community it serves.

'

Prohibited or immoral interventions include: Abortion; sterilization (e.g., vasectomies
and tubal ligations) for birth control purposes; cryopreservation; artificial insemination by
a donor; in vitro fertilization; surrogacy; and “means that deliberately and intentionally
interfere with the procreative aspect in sexual intercourse” (CHAC, 2000, p.40, article
50). To varying degrees and circumstances, these means can include refusals to dispense
condoms, hormonal contraception, and emergency contraception (EC) (CHAC, 2000).
.

\

'

■

Interestingly, final decisions relating to services that are and are not provided are often
left to the local Bishop (McGowan, 2005; Roche, 2010; D. MacDermott, personal

.

communication, September 20, 2010; J. Roche, personal communication, September 17,
2010). Because the Health Ethics Guide (CHAC, 2000) is a ‘guide’ and not a
compendium o f directives, differences in opinion or interpretation by local Bishops can
lead to variability in services offered amongst Catholic hospitals across the country.

3
-

Although a popular and important foundation in bioethics, research and discussion

about conscientious objection has usually focused on the legitimacy of its use by
individual health practitioners (Alta Charo, 2005; Blustein, 1993; Brock, 2008; Cantor &
Baum, 2004; Card, 2007; Savulescu, 2006; Fenton & Lomasky, 2005; Wicclair, 2000). A
review o f the literature reveals a significant gap in the research addressing the legitimacy
of religiously affiliated hospitals to conscientiously object to services that contradict their
guiding religious beliefs (Dickens & Cook, 2000; Fogel & Rivera, 2003, 2004; Gallagher
&Goodstein, 2002; Gallagher, 1997; Pellegrino, 2002; Ryan, 2006; Sulmasy, 2008;
Wicclair, 2011; Wildes, 1997). Less research still, addresses the issue within Canada or
in rural areas (Donovan, 1996; Sloboda, 2001). In order to address the gap, the purpose of
this thesis is to examine the ethical implications of Catholic hospital conscientious
objections to provide reproductive services to which they are morally opposed within the
context of the Canadian health care system, and more specifically within rural areas.
In the following sections I further discuss the topic of conscientious objection, the
history and current status of Catholic hospitals in Canada, and the unique nature of the
rural Canadian context. I conclude by outlining the methods used as well as proposing the
two focal questions for analysis.

1.2 Gonscientious Objection
Conscientious objection within health care, also known as conscientious refusal, is
defined as a refusal to comply with a medically sanctioned request based on personal
moral, or religious moral reasons (Childress, 1979, 1985). In this respect, refusing to
offer requested services is not due to a lack of expertise or of resources, but because

4
. doing so would represent a fundamental moral conflict for the individual HCP or
institution. For the purposes o f this thesis I will use the terms conscientious objection and
conscientious refusal interchangeably.
The place o f conscientious refusals within health care remains an important topic of
discussion within the discipline of bioethics, as well as within relevant academic (e.g.,
philosophy, theology, health law and policy) and professional-practice discourse (e.g.,
relevant policy recommendations, guidelines, statements, and opinion pieces specific to
the practice o f nursing, pharmacy, midwifery, medicine, etc). Indeed, the topic continues
to generate debate not just in North America, but also in many other comers of the globe,
as media outlets, legislators, religious leaders, bioethicists, variousHCPs, and the general
public weigh in on the morally appropriate limits to conscientious objections to health
care services, within applicable national and international contexts (Alarcon, 2009; Card,
2011; Casas, 2009; Cook & Dickens, 1999; Kelly, Ellis & Rosenthal, 2011; Mishtal,
2009; Sacchini & Antico, 2000; Van Bogaert, 2002).
Fueled in part, perhaps, by the lightning speed in which medical advancements occur,
procedures and interventions in their infancy a mere ten to twenty years ago are now
common practice. This rapid evolution of medical options has caused some to question
their role in delivering services to which they object (Curlin, Lawrence, Chin & Lantos,
2007). Presumably, as progress is made, the lines between what we can and what we
. .
. ■
i
;
should do, will only continue to blur, thus leading to increased rates of conscientious
refusals; In addition, Benjamin (1995) suggests: 1) the intimate involvement of our
personal convictions regarding the “nature and meaning of creating, sustaining, and
ending life” (p.515); 2) the potential for radical value differences between HCPs,
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.patients, and families; and 3) the frequent need for “agreement and cooperation on a
single course o f action” (p.515), will only continue to contribute to the prevalence of
appeals to conscience in bioethics.
There are a number of procedures, interventions, and services in health care to which
individuals can object1. However, “the most common examples in the literature and in
day-to-day medical practice continue to involve reproductive medicine: specifically, the
provision o f therapeutic abortion services and access to contraceptive devices and
medication” (Blackmer, 2007, p.16). Most recently, debates have focused on the
conscientious refusals of pharmacists to dispense emergency contraception (Alarcon,
2009; Cantor & Baum, 2004; Fenton & Lomasky, 2005; Davidson,JPettis, Joiner, Cook &
Klugman, 2010; Kelly et al., 2011; Wicclair, 2006) and whether HCPs have an obligation
to inform, treat, or refer patients for reproductive interventions to which they object
(Blustein, 1993; Brock, 2008; Chervenak & McCullough, 2008; Dickens & Cook, 2000;
May & Aulisio, 2009; McLeod, 2008; Savulescu, 2006).
Arguments can, and have been made, on all sides of the conscientious objection
debate. Potential advantages of allowing HCPs to invoke conscience include permitting
them to remain true to their morals and values, thus preserving their personal integrity, as
well as supporting the exercise of independent judgment (Cantor & Baum, 2004;

1 Other areas o f conscientious refusal include, but are not limited to: euthanasia, physician assisted suicide,
experimentation on human embryos, the rejection o f blood products by Jehovah’s Witnesses, the
prescription o f human growth hormone (HGH) to short but otherwise normal children, and the removal or
continuation o f patients from or on artificial life support (Benjamin, 1995; Blackmer, 2007).

. Wicclair, 2000). Allowing individuals to refuse participation in acts that violate their

'

personal, ethical, moral, or religious convictions is also an essential element of a free and
democratic society (Benjamin, 1995; Cantor & Baum, 2004; Pellegrino, 2002). On the
other hand, “in the biomedical context, respect for conscience may be inconvenient,
inefficient, or detrimental to medical outcomes” (Benjamin, 1995, p.515). It may also
serve to impose the values and personal morals of the HCP, while neglecting those of the
patient (Savulescu, 2006). In face of these arguments, the salient question becomes: how
do we manage to be respectful o f a HCP’s (or hospital’s) conscience, while also
safeguarding the patient’s reproductive health and entitlement to autonomy and self
determination?
Although the debate regarding the precise scope of legitimate conscientious objection
continues, it is generally accepted that individual HCPs may refuse, within limits, to
provide services and medications, as well as refuse to directly participate in procedures,
to which they morally oppose. In Canada a number of different professional associations
*

. . .

■

'

*

*y

<

and regulatory colleges have released relevant policy statements and guidelines on or2

2 O f note, professional codes o f ethics provided by national associations such as the Canadian Medical
Association (CMA) (2004), the Canadian Nurses Association (CNA) (2008), and the National Association
o f Pharmacy Regulatory Authorities (NAPRA) (1999), are guidelines provided from within the profession
relevant to its members. In contrast, practice standards outlined by professional colleges such as the
College o f Physicians and Surgeons o f New Brunswick (CPSNB) (2002), and the College o f Registered
Nurses o f British Columbia (CRNBC) (2010), outline the criteria for which professionals are held
accountable to the public. That being said, each may be used to indicate those values o f importance to
professionals.

.

:

-
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.related to the topic (Novel Tech. Ethics, 2010). For instance, both the Canadian Medical
Association (CMA) (1988, 2004) and the Canadian Nurses Association (CNA) (2008)
agree that physicians and nurses should be permitted to follow their conscience, as long
as it does not unduly burden patients or compromise their well-being. This position is
also supported by a number o f the provincial regulatory colleges (College of Nurses of
Ontario [CNO], 2009; College o f Physicians and Surgeons of Alberta [CPSA], 2010;
College o f Physicians and Surgeons ofNew Brunswick [CPSNB], 2002; College of
Pharmacists of British Columbia [CPBC], 2010; Saskatchewan College o f Pharmacists
[SCP], 2000). For nurses who do wish to object, the CNA states that refusals cannot be
“based on prejudice, fear, or convenience” (CNA, 2008, p.45). Although each
organization’s statements are slightly different, doctors, nurses, and pharmacists must
generally inform either the person requesting the service, or management, of their reasons
for objecting, and as much as possible should do so in advance of any request (CMA,
1988; CPSA, 2010; CPSNB, 2002; National Association of Pharmacy Regulatory
Authorities [NAPRA], 1999; Nova Scotia College of Pharmacists [NSCP], 2007; SCP,
'
\
2000). This practice allows for alternate arrangements to be made so that a patient’s
.

choice for the procedure or medication is not significantly affected. :
In contrast to the prolific debate regarding the conscientious objections of individual
HCPs, little attention has been paid to the conscientious refusals of Catholic hospitals
(Dickens & Cook, 2000; Fogel & Rivera, 2003, 2004; Gallagher & Goodstein, 2002;
Gallagher, 1997; Pellegrino, 2002; Ryan, 2006; Sulmasy, 2008; Wicclair, 2011; Wildes,
1997). Fewer still have addressed the unique concerns o f the rural environment or a
Canadian focus (Donovan, 1996; Sloboda, 2001). While certain points of debate may be

8
- similar, there are a number of issues that require special attention and analysis. These
particularities will be addressed in the analysis - chapters two and three.

1.3 Catholic Health Care
,

The Catholic Church maintains a steadfast commitment to fulfilling the teachings of

Jesus Christ in a manner that espouses his compassion and healing presence (CHAC,
2000; McGowan, 2005). Faithful to its mission of administering care to the poor, the
vulnerable, the sick, and the suffering, the Catholic Church remains “ ...the single largest
provider o f health care in the world, truly faithful to the mission given by Christ to teach
and to heal” (McGowan, 2005). Globally, the Church is responsible for upwards of
111.000 Catholic health care institutions - this comprises approximately 6,000 hospitals;
17.000 clinics and primary care institutions; 12,000 homes for the aging and chronically
ill; 800 leprosariums; and 25,300 centers of health care ministry (McGowan, 2005).
Furthermore, 26.7% of the centers around the world providing treatment for people
infected with HIV/AIDS are Catholic-based (Barragán, 2006).
'

'

.

\

The Catholic Church (recognized judicially as the Holy See3) also plays an influential
role on the world diplomatic stage. The scope of its involvement includes participating in
various international organizations, as well as maintaining formal diplomatic

l The “Holy See” is the supreme and central government o f the Roman Catholic Church. It is also

recognized internationally as possessing a legal personality, allowing it to enter into treaties as the juridical
equal o f a State and to send and receive diplomatic representatives (U.S. Department o f State, 2008). The
Holy See is lead by the Pope who exercises ultimate legislative, executive, and judicial power as authorized
to him through Canon law (Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1983, Canon 331).
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- relationships with 177 countries. It is also a permanent observer4 to the United Nations,
the World Health Organization (WHO) (through the World Health Assembly), the World
Food Program (WFP), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Labor
Organization (ILO), and the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) among others (U.S. Department of State, 2008).

1.3.1 Catholic Health Care in Canada
Within Canada, the Roman Catholic Church’s involvement in administering health
care predates the country itself. In fact three Soeurs of the Augustines Hospitalières
established the first hospital in North America in 1639 (Hôtel-Dieu) in Québec City,
Québec (Humbert, 2004). Gradually, other orders of Roman Cathoîîc'Sisters followed
suit and Catholic hospitals were opened across the country (Humbert, 2004). These
hospitals include: St-Boniface Hospital, in St-Boniface, New Brunswick (1847) by the
Grey Sisters; St. Michael’s Hospital, in Toronto, Ontario (1892) by the Sisters o f St.
Joseph; Misericordia General Hospital, in Edmonton, Alberta (1900) by the Soeurs de

4 Observer status is a privilege granted by a number o f Intergovernmental Organizations allowing for the
participation o f non-member States and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) in the
organization’s activities. While observers must generally apply for member status within a fixed number o f
years, the status o f permanent observer is reserved for those who do not qualify for full membership or who
do not wish to become full members but whose participation remains o f mutual benefit (Carbon
Sequestration Leadership Forum [CSLF], 2005). Permanent Observer status is often based on practice and
for the United Nations dates from 1946 (United Nations, n.d.). Permanent observers generally have free
access to meetings and documents, as well as the authority to make presentations and statements but lack
the ability to vote on resolutions (CSLF, 2005; United Nations, n.d.).
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-Miséricorde; and St. Joseph’s General Hospital, in Comox, British Columbia (1926) by
the Sisters of St. Joseph, Toronto (Humbert, 2004).

v

;

:

^

¡

While the number o f Catholic hospitals in Canada has fluctuated throughout the
years, the total number o f Catholic health care facilities currently operating within the
country is ambiguous. A comprehensive review of the literature, relevant databases, and
personal communication (September 17, 2010) with the Executive Director of the
Catholic Health Alliance o f Canada (CHAC)5, James Roche, revealed that a
comprehensive and up to date list of Catholic health care facilities in Canada does not
presently exist. In order to provide an overview of the number of Catholic hospitals
currently operating in the country, an inventory of Catholic health care facilities was
compiled.

*

The document was assembled through a systematic review of the Canadian
Healthcare Association’s, Guide to Canadian Healthcare Facilities (2011). Facilities
marked as religious (Re/.)6 were noted and wherever possible cross-referenced with

5 The Catholic Health Alliance o f Canada [CHAC], formerly the Catholic Health Association o f Canada, is
a nationally based, voluntary alliance o f Catholic health care providers in Canada. Its mission is to
“strengthen and support the ministry o f Catholic health care organizations and providers” (CHAC, n.d.b).
Its mandate is 1) Advocacy: “to be the national voice o f Catholic health care organizations” (CHAC, n.d.b),
and 2) Governance: “to foster the distinctive mission and organizational culture o f Catholic health care
organizations” (CHAC, n.d.b). They also publish the Health Ethics Guide (CHAC, 2000).

6 Health care facilities were defined as religious if they were “owned and controlled by a church or one o f
its branches, a religious order, or by a corporation, association, or society with religious objectives”
(Canadian Healthcare Association, 2011, p.5).
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.organizational and provincial websites, as well as the online CHAC directory (n.d.a)7.
Results of the inventory reveal that there are currently 136 Catholic health care facilities
operating in nine Provinces across the country. O f these 136 facilities, 51 are listed as
hospitals, 68 are long-term-care facilities, and 17 are a combination o f treatment centres,
hospices, retirement homes, outpatient centres, nursing stations, home care, and others
(see Appendix A.).

1.3.2 Catholic Health Care Facility Sponsorship
To qualify as a Catholic health care facility, an institution must have a sponsor.
Sponsors ensure facilities “remain true to Catholic values and identity” (McGowan, 2005,
p.4). Examples o f sponsors include: religious institutes such as the UrSuline Sisters, the
Sisters of Providence, and the Grey Nuns; Dioceses such as the Archdiocese of Winnipeg
and the Diocese o f Victoria; and associations or corporations such as the Catholic Health
Corporation o f Ontario and the St. Joseph’s Health Care Society (McGowan, 2005).
Although sponsors can contribute financially through the administration o f foundations
and land ownership, the operating budgets of Catholic hospitals are allocated by
provincial governments and administered through their respective funding systems (e.g.,

7 In reviewing the pages o f the Guide to Canadian Healthcare Facilities (Canadian Healthcare Association,
2011) I came across a number o f institutions that were mis-labeled (e.g., missing the ‘rei’ [religious]
designation or having the ‘rei’ designation when the facility was no longer religiously affiliated). Although

'

.

i

every effort was made to cross-reference any facility noted on the CHAC directory list but missed in the
Guide to Canadian Healthcare Facilities (Canadian Healthcare Association, 2011) or suspected as being
mis-labeled in the Guide to Canadian Healthcare Facilities (Canadian Healthcare Association, 2011),
human error is such that a few institutions may have been missed.
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- through regional health authorities)(Canadian Institute for Health Information [CIHI],
2005; D. MacDermott, personal communication, September 20, 2010).

:

As the capacity of founding religious institutes to maintain the governance and
sponsorship of their health care facilities dwindles, many new entities, in the form of lay
organizations and societies, have been established to assume the role of sponsor
(McGowan, 2005; Roche, 2010). In addition to their formal canonical status as public
juridic persons (PJP)8 o f pontifical or diocesan right, these organizations have also
adopted corporate status, permitting them reserved authority under both Civil and Canon
Law (Roche, 2010). For founding institutes, the transfer of authority to a public juridic
sponsor is generally viewed as a favourable option, as it assures the official continuation
of the institution’s Catholic ministry as well as their legacy (McGowan, 2005).
In Canada, an example o f the PJP of pontifical right model is the Catholic Health
Sponsors o f Ontario, who operate civilly as the Catholic Health Corporation of Ontario
(CHCO). Operating within a decentralized framework, each sponsored institution
maintains its own Board of Trustees and chief executive officer (CEO). In order to retain
oversight, directors o f the CHCO sit as members of each institution’s Board, deferring
certain reserved rights - such as the approval or dismissal of the CEO and directors, as
well as the spending or sale o f major assets - to the board of the CHCO (Roche, 2010).

8 As defined by Canon 116, “public juridic persons are aggregates o f persons or things which are
established by the competent ecclesiastical authority so that, within the limits allotted to them, they might
in the name o f the church and in accordance with the provisions o f law, fulfill the specific task entrusted to
them in view o f the public good” (McGowan, 2005, p.7).
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As a PJP of pontifical right, the CHCO is directly accountable to the Vatican (to whom it
reports annually) for ensuring its sponsored institutions maintain their Catholic identity,
which includes the consistent application of the Health Ethics Guide (CHAC, 2000)
approved by the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops (Roche, 2010; McGowan,
2005).

,

. ;

" Conversely, Catholic Health of Alberta, who acts as a sponsor for all health care
facilities who fall under Covenant Health Alberta, operates under the PJP o f diocesan
right model. Catholic Health o f Alberta’s members include all the Bishops of Alberta
with the Archbishop o f Edmonton as the permanent chairperson. Like the CHCO,
Catholic Health of Alberta maintains reserved rights but is directly^accountable to the
Alberta bishops (as opposed to the Holy See) for the promotion of institution Catholicity
th

(McGowan, 1999; J. Roche, personal communication, September 17 2010).
As Catholic hospitals seek to provide health care in the twenty-first century, it will be
interesting to observe how they cope with evolving pressures from society, science, and
the potentially competing demands these may place on their religious beliefs.

1.4 The Rural Context
The rural health care setting is a unique and challenging environment. Yet despite the
distinct nature of these communities, there is a significant lack of research surrounding
those issues most pertinent to them (Kirby & LeBreton, 2002a; Nelson & Schmidek,
2008; Romanow, 2002; CIHI, 2006). This is compounded by the lack of a singular
definition o f what is meant by the term ‘rural’. Interpretations of the term can for
instance, be population dependent (less than 10 000 inhabitants), distance dependent (a
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- set number o f kilometers away from an urban center), or dependent on social
representation (culture and way o f life) (Nelson & Schmidek, 2008; du Plessis, Beshiri,
Bollman & Clemenson, 2001, 2002). This variability has led to a great deal of ambiguity
regarding the meaning o f ‘rural’, making it difficult to pinpoint a precise definition.
For the purpose o f this thesis I will assume the ‘rural and small town’ definition of
rural as outlined by Statistics Canada. According to this definition “rural refers to
individuals in towns or municipalities outside the commuting zone of larger urban centres
(with 10,000 or more population)” (du Plessis et al., 2001, p.6). I have chosen this
definition for two significant reasons: first, because it is recommended by Statistics
Canada as a starting benchmark for understanding Canada’s rural population; and second
because it is listed as an appropriate definition for describing issues with a community
focus, including issues related to accessing health care services (du Plessis et ah, 2001,
2002 ) .

.

1.4.1 The Importance of Studying Rural Health Care Ethics
There are four primary reasons why the study of rural health ethics is of importance.
The first concerns the significant number of people who continue to live in rural
communities. According to our definition this represents approximately 22% of the
population or 6.2 million Canadians (du Plessis et ah, 2001,2002). The second
consideration concerns the often-distinct characteristics of rural communities. These
include but are not limited to a higher concentration of low-income earners, higher
poverty rates, increased rates o f mental health issues, and increased involvement in risky
sexual behaviour resulting in higher rates of teen pregnancy and sexually transmitted
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infections (STIs) (CIHI, 2006; Dryburgh, 2000; Nelson & Schmidek, 2008; Romanow,
2002; Pong, 2007; Fairbaim & Gustafson, 2008; Kirby & LeBreton, 2002a). Third, there
exist fewer health care providers and institutions per capita, than in urban areas,
engendering shortages and longer wait times (Romanow, 2002; Kirby & LeBreton,

■:

2002a; Fairbaim & Gustafson, 2008). Finally, ethical issues such as: ‘safeguarding
confidentiality’, ‘boundary conflicts due to overlapping relations’, ‘access to health care
services’, ‘allocation o f health care resources’, ‘reluctance to seek a diagnosis due to
stigma’, and ‘community cultural value conflicts’ can each become serious problems and
are often neglected in discussions concerning general ethical issues (Nelson, 2004;
Nelson & Schmidek, 2008). For these reasons, research that incorporates a rural lens or
that comments on the rural context is important and needed.

1.5 Methods
Traditionally ethics and morality are studied in a philosophical context with a focus
on normative as opposed to descriptive knowledge claims (Kagan, 1998). Therefore, in
contrast to descriptive ethics (a subset of non-normative ethics) which uses empirical
methods to investigate how people reason through and react to particular moral situations
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009), normative ethics “involves substantive proposals
concerning how [one should] act, how [one should] live, or what kind of person [one
should be]. In particular, it attempts to state and defend the most basic principles
governing these matters” (Kagan, 1998, p. 2). Normative analysis thus seeks to describe
what ought to be the case or what ethical norms should guide ethical conduct
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; Kagan, 1998).

<
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j ; Although both normative and non-normative approaches to understanding morality
are important and useful, one’s guiding questions as well as one’s purpose for asking
these questions will differ depending on the approach assumed (Kagan, 1998). For
example, if we wish to understand how moral norms guide professional practice in health
care or how individuals go about confronting difficult moral dilemmas on a daily basis, a
descriptive approach is best (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009). Curlin, Lawrence, Chin &
Lantos (2007) effectively used this method when inquiring how physicians interpret their
ethical rights and obligations when conflicts o f conscience arise within clinical practice.
In contrast to descriptive approaches, normative approaches are best suited to
situations where one seeks to “state and defend substantive moral claims” (Kagan, 1998,
p. 8). Within the category o f normative ethics, Beauchamp & Childress (2009) also add
applied ethics. The focus of applied ethics is the application of normative moral
principles, theories, and precedents to specific complex cases and contexts (Beauchamp
& Childress, 2009; Kagan, 1998). This approach is useful in outlining injustices as well
as drawing attention to inconsistencies between how people, organizations, and societies
currently act and how they should act (ethically speaking) (e.g., simply because an action
is legal does not mean it is ethical and vice versa). Because the purpose of my thesis is to
analyze a relatively specific issue as well as to offer moral judgment and prescriptions
related to it, my thesis can most accurately be described as normative and localized more
specifically within the realm of applied ethics.
In assuming this approach I undertake a process o f reasoned ethical analysis,
informed by various normative ethical constructs such as those related to justice,
beneficence, non-maleficence, and autonomy. In so doing, relevant arguments are
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presented and the important task of determining which side presents the stronger case is
outlined (Kagan, 1998). Through this process one constructs an ethical analysis that is
expected to be both compelling and based on solid moral reasoning and justification.

1.6 Restatement of Purpose & Proposal of Research Questions
With 51 hospitals currently operating in eight provinces across the country (the
Province o f Newfoundland does not currently have Catholic hospitals only one long term
care facility) (see Appendix A.), Catholic hospitals remain important players in the
Canadian health care system. Despite their significant involvement in providing health
care however, little attention has focused on the legitimacy of Catholic hospitals to
conscientiously refuse to provide services that contradict their guiding religious beliefs.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the ethical implications of Catholic hospital
conscientious objections to provide reproductive services to which they are morally
opposed within the context of the Canadian health care system, and more specifically
within rural areas. Moving forward the following two questions will assume the focus of
the analysis.
1) Do hospitals possess a conscience according to the dominant view of conscience
in bioethics?

*

2) Should Catholic hospitals be permitted to refuse to provide reproductive services
to which they are morally opposed within the context of the Canadian health care
system and in particular, within rural areas?
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conscientious refusals of Catholic hospitals in Canada, spark dialogue and debate, and
finally, to inform and influence future health policy decisions.
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Chapter 2. Conscience: Do Hospitals Qualify?
2.1 Introduction
The importance o f establishing a firm understanding o f conscience lies in determining
whether those who claim objections based on conscience use the term appropriately.
Although there is a general consensus that individual human beings can claim to have a
conscience (Benjamin, 1995), whether institutions and therefore hospitals can reasonably
claim to possess a conscience, remains contested.
According to Cook and Dickens (1999), “Conscience is a right of individuals, but not
of institutions such as hospitals and clinics” (p.85). They argue thatT’w hile corporations
may benefit from a ‘legal personality’ in the context of various National and International
laws, they are granted this status for purely pragmatic reasons (e.g., to allow
organizations to sue and be sued, enter into contracts, and conduct business as a single
entity) and therefore, unlike humans, do not possess a conscience. Given these
limitations, hospitals they argue, are thereby precluded from enjoying the same
entitlements (e.g., freedom of conscience) as ‘natural persons’ (humans) under
international human rights legislation (Dickens & Cook, 2000). This position is also
supported by Canadian Constitutional law, under which “corporations do not enjoy or
exercise freedom o f religion or conscience and, therefore, cannot claim an infringement
of their own rights. Freedom o f religion or conscience is a freedom that only individuals
possess” (Wynn, Erdman, Foster & Trussell, 2007, p.258).
In contrast to these primarily legal points of view, authors such as Sulmasy (2008),
De George (1982), and Gallagher and Goodstein (2002), argue that hospitals do in fact
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have a legitimate claim to conscience, which is largely afforded to them via their
established structures and processes. Although the possession o f a conscience does not
■
'
r
automatically engender a right or entitlement to make objections based upon it, it is the
base standard, or first requirement for it. As such, the question of whether institutions,
and thereby hospitals, possess a conscience is an important stepping stone in exploring
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a Catholic hospital’s claim to conscientious refusal.
There are a number o f ways in which to understand conscience. The prevailing view
within bioethics, titled the “dominant view” by McLeod (forthcoming), is that conscience
works to preserve or promote integrity, and does so by influencing agents to act in line
with their moral values. The purpose of this chapter is to determine-whether the dominant
view o f conscience allows us to say that hospitals have a conscience. Assuming the
‘Dominant View’ is correct, I will argue that hospitals, as institutions, cannot possess a
conscience because they fail to fulfill a number of the necessary criteria for it.
To pursue my objective, the first section of the chapter begins with a brief
introduction to the notion o f conscience, followed by .a description o f the dominant view,
and a proposal o f the criteria necessary for an entity to qualify as possessing a conscience
on,this view. In the second section, using the developed criteria as a framework for
analysis, I will discuss reasons why hospitals might satisfy the requirements for
conscience as well as reasons why they might not. Ultimately, I will conclude the
dominant view does not support the contention that hospitals have a conscience.
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2.2 Conscience
2.2.1 A Brief Introduction to Conscience
■Originating in the discipline o f Christian moral theology (Benjamin, 1995; Hardt,
2008), the concept o f conscience remains a fixture in contemporary academic and social
discourse. Reference to it can be observed throughout various works, from the insightful
teachings o f Mahatma Gandhi (Rattan, 1991) to the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights (United Nations, 1948, Articles 1 & 18). So engrained is the concept within the
moral fabric of contemporary North-American and European societies that it has even
been modeled into cartoon form, as portrayed by the lovable character Jiminy Cricket in
Disney’s 1940 rendition o f Pinocchio.

■

The concept of conscience has also received growing attention in the field of
medicine and bioethics, as conscience is relevant to the task o f morally complex decision
making within our increasingly pluralistic society. Presumably, as science continues to
push the boundaries of medicine, and the complexity of health care decisions grow, so
too will the number o f conflicts of conscience and conscientious refusals. Despite the
established presence of conscience within society, however, scholars throughout history .
have often disagreed about its nature and have presented varied and, at times,
contradictory descriptions o f the concept (Benjamin, 1995; Lawrence & Curlin, 2007;
McGee, 2007). The existence of such opposing understandings is brought to bear in the
following passage by Bernard Wand (1961).
It has been said of conscience that it is fallible (Broad), that it is infallible
(Butler); that its ultimate basis is emotional (Mill), that its ultimate source is
rational (Rashdall); that it is the voice of God (Hartman), or the voice o f custom
(Paulsen); that it is merely advisory (Nowell-Smith), that it is unconscious
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(Freud); that it is [a] faculty (Butler), that it is not (any contemporary moral
philosopher); that it is disposition to have certain beliefs, emotions, and conations
which, when operative issue in conscientious actions (Broad), and that it is
conscientious action (Ryle) (p.771).
Although the debate continues, agreeing upon a definition o f conscience is an essential
step in establishing the fundamental requirements for it. In other words, we must gamer a
solid understanding of conscience before we can determine what would qualify an entity
for it.

‘

■
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2.2.2 Gonscience: The Dominant View
Despite the lack of consensus about how to understand conscience both within and
across many disciplines (e.g., philosophy, theology), there is some consensus on the
matter within bioethics. The relevant view of conscience, aptly named the dominant view
by McLeod (forthcoming), proposes that conscience is best interpreted as a mode of
reflective consciousness, wherein one’s actions, or projected actions, are assessed for
their consistency with one’s moral values and standards. Conscience, as such, works to
promote and maintain moral unity - understood as integrity - by compelling individuals to
reliably act and conduct themselves in agreement with their moral values. The main
advocates o f this view are Martin Benjamin (1995), Jeffrey Blustein (1993), James
Childress (1979, 1997), and Mark Wicclair (2000, 2006, 2007) (as cited in McLeod,
forthcoming). (Hereafter, “conscience” will refer to the term as understood on the
dominant view.)

-

: .

2.2.2.1 Criteria For Conscience
In the following section I will describe the five criteria an entity would need to fulfill
in order to qualify as possessing a conscience. To accomplish this objective, I first need
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to develop the criteria, because a previously established list does not exist. Together these
criteria should serve as a reliable template for analyzing an entity’s claim to conscience.
In addition, each o f the criteria is individually necessary and together they are jointly

:

sufficient for something to have a conscience.
i) The entity must be a reasonable candidate for moral agency.
ii) The entity must possess a set of values, which jointly contribute to the formation
- o f its identity and self-concept.
iii) The entity must possess cognitive agency. By “cognitive agency,” I mean the
entity must be able to evaluate its actions, intentions, and desires regarding a
situation based on its established set of values. Stated differently, the entity
must be able to preserve or promote its inner moral unity by engaging in a
relevant form of moral reasoning.
iv) The entity must have enough affective agency so that it can appropriately
experience guilt and shame.

..........................

v) The entity must ultimately be subject to internal sanctioning, whereby feelings of
shame and guilt are self imposed and internally mediated.

2.2.2.1.1 Criterion One - Candidacy for Moral Agency
The first requirement for conscience is that the entity in question must be a reasonable
candidate for moral agency. To be a moral agent entails that one possesses the ability to
identify, understand, and comply with relevant and applicable moral standards
(Eshleman, 2009; Himma, 2008). We assign moral blame to agents who fail to uphold
their moral obligations, because by virtue o f their status as moral agents, they are

^
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- responsible for ensuring that their actions and inactions conform to those obligations.
Because conscience is a moral quality, it encourages people to behave in accordance not
with their mere preferences, but with their moral values (Blustein, 1993; Childress, 1979;
Wicclair, 2000). To have a conscience is to possess at least some level o f moral agency,
because it is the role of conscience to help keep us, and our actions, accountable to our
own moral standards, as well as to alert us when we are at risk of violating them.
Therefore, to have a conscience is at the very least to be among the group that could
conceivably qualify as moral agents.
This first criterion for conscience also encompasses the rest, in that the remaining
criteria are all elements o f moral agency. Being the sort of moral agent then who
possesses these further qualities is sufficient for having a conscience.

2.2.2.1.2 Criterion T w o - Value Framework

r
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A second important requirement for conscience is that the entity in question possesses
a set o f values, which jointly contribute to the formation o f its moral identity and moral
„
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self-concept. These commitments are especially important as they form the moral
framework or ‘master list’ of moral values, rules, and standards to which conscience
refers. According to the dominant view, an agent’s integrity, or moral unity, depends
upon their adherence to their espoused moral framework. Failure to uphold these moral
commitments erodes their moral identity and causes emotional distress (McLeod,
forthcoming). Heeding conscience preserves or promotes inner unity while transgressing
the verdicts o f conscience results in the imposition of negative sanctions and the
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- experience o f moral fracture. (These last points are further discussed under criteria four
and five.)

2.2.2.1.3 Criterion Three - Cognitive Agency
Thirdly, conscience includes a cognitive or evaluative component. This element is
essential to the function of conscience; it permits the contextual application and
interpretation o f the agent’s moral values, rules, and standards. In other words, having a
conscience requires not only a set o f values but also being able to examine these values
and determine their weight, significance, and relevance to the situation in question.
Therefore, while an individual may strongly value respect for human life in all its shapes
and forms, when faced with a decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment to a patient
in a persistent vegetative state (PVS), he/she may freely reconcile with a decision to do
so, knowing that it would eventuate in the patient’s death, on the grounds that he/she also
values respecting expressed patient wishes, and that continuing treatment would
compromise the patient’s basic human dignity by prolonging unnecessary pain and
suffering. As this example shows, when evaluating a situation, individuals must often
take into consideration multiple values (in our case three: respect for human life, for
autonomy, and for human dignity) and in turn decide on a course o f action based on their
assessment of each value’s relevance and importance given the circumstance(s).
Conversely, to maintain self-harmony and unity, individuals must also evaluate their
actions, anticipated actions, and intentions regarding a situation based upon their
understanding of what these values require of them.

.■
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The evaluative component of conscience also signifies that while one’s moral
commitments play a crucial role in informing conscience, they themselves do not equal
conscience (Childress, 1979). Childress (1979) makes this distinction, stating: “Although
a person’s appeal to his conscience usually involves an appeal to moral standards,
conscience is not itself the standard. It is the mode o f consciousness resulting from the
application o f standards to his conduct” (p.319). Conscience works to promote and
maintain integrity by evaluating a situation based on whether it fits with one’s moral
values, and informing the individual whether he/she will feel guilt or shame as a result. In
so doing, conscience operates both prospectively and retrospectively: promoting integrity
by highlighting past wrongs and warning of future disharmony, should contemplated
wrongs be committed (Benjamin, 1995; Childress, 1979, 1997). _

2.2.2.1.4 Criterion Four - Affective Agency
The fourth requirement for conscience is affective or emotional. As Childress (1979)
notes, conscience functions as an inner moral sanction, the ultimate and final arbiter,
■
'
■
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whose negative verdicts - imposed through feelings of guilt, shame and self-betrayal - are
accompanied by the aching consciousness o f a fundamental loss of integrity. Whereas a
good conscience - often described by terms such as: ‘clean’, ‘whole’, ‘quiet’, and
‘integrated’ (Childress, 1979, 1997) - sits quietly on its own, pure as a lamb and
uninterrupted in its thoughts, a bad conscience makes its presence distinctly known,
rearing its ugly head with no apparent escape from the negative sanctions it wishes to
impose. Proponents of the dominant view postulate that conscience mediates behaviour
by threatening individuals with unpleasant emotions that they would much rather avoid.
Because conscience works to promote positive behaviour through the threat of negative
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sanctions, it is logical that an entity moved by conscience must first possess the capacity
to experience the negative emotions (guilt and shame) with which it is threatened. An
entity must therefore have enough affective agency to feel and experience the emotions
of moral guilt and shame: the emotions that conscience uses to ensure agents remain
accountable to their own moral standards.

:-

2.2.2.1.5 Criterion Five - Internal Sanctioning
In addition to its affective component, conscience on the dominant view requires that
the entity in question be subject to internal sanctioning. The judgments o f conscience
come from within and reflect one’s own assessment o f right and wrong as opposed to
external judgments or sanctions imposed by others. As noted above, the threat that
conscience poses is a loss of integrity: being kept in proper balance with oneself and not
necessarily with others or with popular society. To prohibit an agent from following the
dictates of her conscience would be to force her to commit a form o f self-betrayal and
submit to the negative sanctions of her conscience (Wicclair, 2000, 2006, 2007). In short,
the capacity not only to feel guilt and shame, but also to actively ‘punish’ oneself with
these feelings as a result o f misguided thoughts or actions is a necessary part of
possessing a conscience.

2.2.2.2 Support For the Dominant View
McLeod (forthcoming) gives a number of reasons for thinking that the dominant view
is correct. Among the most compelling arguments is that the:dramatic language often
used by conscientious objectors reinforces the threatening nature of conscience, while
underscoring its commitment to preserving inner moral unity. Examples o f such appeals
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include: “I must protect my sense o f m yself’; “I wouldn’t be able to live with myself if I
did [X]”; “I wouldn’t be able to look myself in the mirror/sleep at night”; “I could no
longer think of myself as a Jehovah’s Witness [Catholic, Jew, moral person etc...] if I
were to do or assist in [Y]” (Childress, 1997,2006; Benjamin, 1995). Furthermore, as
McLeod (forthcoming) notes, the dominant view coheres well with three other broadly
popular aspects of conscience: namely that a conscience is uneasy when it is guilty fitting with the dominant view’s portrayal of conscience as causing distress in the face of
moral discord (Childress, 1979, 2006); that its jurisdiction to impose sanctions is strictly
personal (i.e., its verdicts are limited to our own actions or inactions and not the actions
or inactions o f others) - suggesting a concern for the self and protection of one’s own
integrity vs. a general concern for what is right (Benjamin, 1995; Blustein, 1993; Ryle,
1940); and that it respects the distinction between making a moral judgment (e.g., X is
morally wrong) and making an appeal to conscience (e.g., X is morally wrong and there
is an added wrongness for me to participate in X because it would compromise my
integrity) (Blustein, 1993).
Thus, the dominant view has compelling aspects to it. To sum up the view itself:
conscience is a mode of reflective consciousness which influences one to act, either
prospectively or retrospectively, in accordance with one’s moral values in order to
promote and maintain individual moral integrity. Failing to abide by one’s conscience
causes distress in the form of guilt and shame (negative sanctions), and leads to fractures
within the self. Using this definition, I established five criteria for having a conscience: 1)
being a reasonable candidate for moral agency; 2) possessing a set o f values which help
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. to define the self; 3) possessing cognitive agency; 4) possessing affective agency; and 5)
being capable of internal sanctioning.

The dominant view is not immune to criticism (see McLeod, forthcoming).
Nevertheless, it is dominant in bioethics, and more importantly, it is compelling in many
ways. Thusj it is worth discerning whether the view would allow for institutional
conscience. In the next section, I use the criteria I have developed as a framework for
analyzing whether hospitals have a legitimate claim to conscience.

2.3 Assessing The Hospital’s Claim To Conscience
While discussing in this section whether hospitals are reasonable candidates for
having a conscience, I will examine reasons that various authors offer for why hospitals
do possess a conscience. I will also ultimately argue that such a view about hospitals is
incorrect.

■

2.3.1 Criterion One - Candidacy for Moral Agency
The literature on moral agency identifies two different kinds of agents: 1) individual
agents and 2) collective agents. To quote from this literature:
. While the notion of moral responsibility, traditionally understood, grounds moral
blameworthiness in the will of discrete individuals who freely cause harm, the
notion of collective responsibility associates both causation and blameworthiness
with groups and construes groups as moral agents in their own right (Smiley,
2011, p.2).
Conceptualized as such, groups are alleged, for all intents and purposes, to possess the
ability to formulate intentions and to act as a unified entity with similar rights, privileges,
and demands afforded to and imposed upon them as on individual moral agents (Smiley,
2011). To function as a collective agent is to act not as a mere aggregate of individuals,
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. but as a non-distributive entity that “transcends the contributions of particular group
members” (Smiley, 2011, p. 4).
An ideal example of such an agent is that of the Borg, a fictional pseudo-race of
‘cybernetic organisms’ (beings with both biological and artificial parts) featured in the
series Star Trek. Unaware o f being made up of discrete individuals, the Borg form an
integrated collective of drones who operate with a shared consciousness, or a ‘hive
mind” which allows them to think and act as one (“Borg”, n.d.). Thus, it is impossible to
refer to the encounters, actions, and deliberations of one drone without referring, to those
of the entire collective and vice versa.

:
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As I have said, the Borg represents the ‘ideal’ (collective agentjfm practice it is not
necessary for a group to achieve such a pervasive level of integration in order to qualify
as a collective agent. What is necessary, however, is that agents move away from
thinking and acting only as discrete individuals and move towards defining their
thoughts, actions, failures and accomplishments, intentions, and subsequent identity as
one with the collective. Accordingly, proponents of collective responsibility advocate that
i
■ '
.
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groups, through their own established structures and processes, can bring about actions
not possible o f individuals alone (Cooper, 1968; French, 1998; May, 1987; as cited in
Smiley, 2011). As Buchholz and Rosenthal (referring to Werhane 1985) suggest:
In a collective action each individual action is mixed with others and transformed
into an action or policy o f the organization. Because of this process of
transformation, the collective action of the corporation is quite different from the
primary inputs of any o f the individual contributors (Buchholz & Rosenthal,
2006, p.238).
Proponents also highlight that as a society, we are often quick to assign generalized
blame to groups, corporations, and organizations, which presupposes that some level of
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collective responsibility/agency exists (Cooper, 1968; Tollefsen, 2006; as cited in Smiley,
2011).
Those who favor a hospital’s claim to conscience (Gallagher & Goodstein, 2002;
Pellegrino, 2002; Sulmasy, 2008; Wildes, 1997) often speak of the organization as a
collective moral agent, whose integrity reflects the actions and deliberations it
undertakes. In this way, authors attempt, albeit in different ways, to characterize hospitals
as legitimate moral agents who, in their own right, possess a collective conscience. While
there is still debate regarding whether institutions, such as hospitals, often operate or truly
qualify as collective agents (Smiley, 2011),9 it is sufficient for the purposes of this paper
that they find themselves among those that are plausible candidatesL_fpr moral agency.
Recall that the first criterion for conscience developed above was that the entity be a
candidate for moral agency. We can therefore accept, at least for the time being, that
hospitals satisfy this criterion, not because they count as individual moral agents^ but
because they could easily count as collective moral agents.

^

2.3.2 Criterion Two - Value Framework
Moving forward, in order to successfully fulfill the second criterion for conscience,
an entity must possess an established set of values, which in turn contribute to the

9 Those who raise concerns about the legitimacy o f collective responsibility highlight a number o f
controversies, two o f which include: 1) whether groups/organizations can form intentions and act upon
these intentions; 2) whether groups/organizations, as distinct from group/organization members, can be
morally blameworthy (Smiley, 2011). For a more in depth look at the controversy and an overview o f the
current debate, see Smiley (2011).

32
formation of its identity and self-concept. To satisfy this condition, advocates o f the idea
that hospitals can have a conscience are often quick to draw similarities between hospital
mission statements and their more personal counterpart, individual value frameworks
(Pellegrino, 2002; Sulmasy, 2008; Wildes, 1997).
Mission statements are primarily defined as management tools that serve to internally
motivate staff while concurrently establishing the direction, objectives, and ideology of
an organization. At their fullest, they are formal documents that outline an institution’s
purpose, vision, and values, and are subsequently meant to guide decision-making and
resource allocation (Bart, 2007; Bart & Hupfer, 2004; Forbes & Seena, 2006).
Understood as such, mission statements, like personal value frameworks, can provide
hospitals and those working within them, with an ontology, or paradigm of sorts, for
understanding how the organization views the world and how health care should be
delivered. In this way, as argued by Sulmasy (2008) and Wildes (1997), established
guidelines provide a framework of values upon which individuals can draw and similar to
personal value commitments, help to inform conscience and guide decision-making
across the organization. Some say, that in addition to their role as general value
frameworks, mission statements are both a source and an expression of the hospital’s
shared values, commitments, and culture (Bart, 2007), and thereby serve as a mechanism
through which it can manifest a distinct moral identity (Pellegrino, 2002; Sulmasy, 2008;
Wildes, 1997).

*

Integrated into the mission statements of Catholic hospitals are the established
principles and teachings of the Roman Catholic Church (Bart, 2007; CHAC, 2000;
O ’Rourke, 2001). The values that inform these statements contribute to a moral identity
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founded at least partly in the teachings of Jesus Christ. A religious institution’s identity is
often strongly linked to its mission (O’Rourke, 2001; Smith litis, 2001; Stempsey, 2001;
Wildes, 1997),10 which according to Pellegrino (2002) provides it with a strong claim to
having a conscience.

- ■
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The analogy between personal value frameworks and mission statements is quite
strong. Nevertheless, there are two reasons to be suspicious of whether, despite having
mission statements, some health care institutions satisfy the second criterion for
conscience.
The first concern relates to the potentially vague nature of mission statements as
explicit value frameworks. Because these statements are generally designed for high
level, overarching guidance, they often sacrifice specificity in exchange for broader, more
generalized themes o f guidance. Teasing out more than a few specific values might not
always be possible, thereby requiring professionals to simultaneously consult and apply
their own, or alternate, values to a situation. This process is further complicated by the
nature o f mission statements as unranked decision guidelines, making not merely
cognition (criterion three) but the addition of further values, such as those that help rank
competing principles, necessary in cases of conflict.

10 Note this does not preclude secular hospitals from forging a strong identity relationship with their own
mission statements. Nor does it mean that to have a strong identity a hospital’s values must be religiously
based. The link between mission statements, identity, and integrity simply seems to be more emphasized in
the literature regarding the identity o f Catholic hospitals.
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Consider for example the established organizational values of St. Joseph’s Health .
Care, London (London, Ontario, Canada): respect, excellence, and compassion (St.
Joseph’s Health Care, London, 2010); or those of St. Michael’s Hospital (Toronto,
Ontario, Canada): Human dignity, excellence, compassion, social responsibility,
community of service, and pride o f achievement (St. Michael’s Hospital, 2011). As value
statements they are certainly representative of what the organization wishes to achieve as
a whole, but as tangible and applicable values, they are vague and still require a great
deal o f situational manipulation and interpretation. Although under Criterion two, we are
concerned with the simple existence of an established set of values, the factor of
ambiguity is important to note, as it will return to play a decisive role in the analysis of
later criteria.

..

The second important point of contention lies in the potential for collective ownership
of the institutional mission statement. As an administrative tool, common buy-in across
various levels and sectors of the organization is essential for collective application
(Wildes, 1997). If a mission statement is not completely representative o f the culture, or
is poorly developed - for example if it is developed too quickly or without sufficient staff
consultation - its legitimacy and authority, as an overarching value framework and
identity-conferring tool, will be weak. This point too will return in our discussion of the
remaining criteria for conscience.
Despite these concerns, mission statements, if they are well developed, can work to
establish a sufficiently recognizable set of institutional values, which in turn can
contribute to the formation of the hospital’s identity and self-concept. Thus, while having
some reservations about whether some health care facilities satisfy the second criterion is
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. appropriate, hospitals whose mission statements genuinely define their identity can fulfill
both parts (set o f values, moral identity) of this criterion.

2.3.3 Criterion Three - Cognitive Agency
The next and third important element is the ability for an entity to engage in moral
reasoning. This ability is what permits the contextual application and interpretation of
one’s value framework. Possessing a conscience is not only about adopting a set of
values as one’s own, but also about evaluating (either consciously, or subconsciously via
intuition or perception) one’s actions, or anticipated actions and desires regarding a
situation, based upon these values.
A number o f authors assume or argue that hospitals exercise cognitive agency. For
example, Sulmasy (2008) claims that,

:

The conscience o f an institution is rooted in the fact that it professes a set of
fundamental moral commitments... and is exercised in making the moral
judgment that a decision that it has made or is considering would violate 1
those...commitments (p. 143).
The assumption here is that hospitals possess the cognitive agency necessary for having a
conscience and that the individuals, who work for it, will judge whether or not the
hospital has lived up to its values and moral expectations.
Hospitals have this ability, according to Gallagher and Goodstein (2002), because of
what these commentators call “mission discernment”: “...a core organizational process
that allows health care institutions to actively reflect on their mission and core values and
confront the ethical challenges posed by the contemporary health care context” (p.435).
In this way, actors within the hospital, such as members of governing Boards,
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committees, policy councils, and ethics teams, make decisions based on the hospital’s
moral values and commitments by reasoning together as a collective agent. According to
advocates of institutional conscience, these groups and bodies, especially at the Board
and governance levels, can engage in collective moral cognition and reasoning, thereby
achieving a collective mental state representative of the hospital (Gallagher & Goodstein,
2002; Sulmasy, 2008).

,

But in many ways; it remains problematic to attribute cognitive agency - collective or
otherwise - to hospitals or institutions. As Sulmasy (2008) and Gallagher and Goodstein
(2002) would have us believe, hospitals do in fact possess the ability to apply their
established organizational values to particular contexts. They do soon the manner of a
collective agent, wherein employees from the boardroom to the bedside, work
collectively, advancing and applying the values o f the organization to everyday problems
and situations. But are we really speaking of a truly collective conscience that can
respond to situations in light of the organization’s values, in a consistent and morally
unified way, or are we more accurately referring to a number of agents, who individually,
through the efforts of their own conscience, work to interpret and apply the established
values of the hospital? In the following paragraphs I will argue that hospital employees
do not function as a collective cognitive agent, but instead, as individual agents, who
themselves engage in cognitive reasoning and reflection on behalf of the hospital in
unique, introspective, and personally inspired ways. To do so, I will first examine the
interpretation and application o f hospital values at the level o f the individual health care
professional (HCP)/employee and second, at the Board level.
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2.3.3.1 The Individual HCP or Employee Level
In a multicultural society, the content of people’s consciences will vary considerably
depending on their personal, professional, and social roles or values. Moreover, research
suggests that among complex organizations, especially those divided along clear
occupational lines, such as hospitals, various subcultures will emerge (Scott, Mannion,
Davies, & Marshall, 2003). Although individuals within these co-existing subcultures are
linked by a common thread - i.e., the delivery of health care services within an
organization - Scott et al. (2003) indicate that each person’s professional affiliation
(whether they are administrators, doctors, nurses, therapists, clerks, porters, or cleaners),
as well as their gender, ethnicity, social class, religion, and even sub-specialty, can create
a distinctive sense o f identity and purpose.

^

Health care is a value-laden enterprise. Accordingly, there are calls for professionals
at all levels of the hospital to behave not as ‘automatons’, or ‘technical clerks’ (Wicclair,
2006), but as conscientious and knowledgeable stewards of their profession and affiliated
organization. To ask less of these people would be to compromise their personal as well
as their professional integrity. As hospitals grow in diversity and complexity, the mixing
of personal, professional, and organizational values will invariably create differences in
moral interpretation across the organization. While the values of the hospital may remain
those o f the organization as a whole, their centrality to the everyday workings of
individual conscience will depend upon their positioning as ‘deep moral commitments’ those values most central to one’s core moral identity - as well as the significance
individuals see them having to particular situations.
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While governance Boards grapple with joint decision-making, we might, for the time
being, consider their efforts as channeling those of a collective moral agent, whose
deliberations reflect a shared collective conscience. As we expand from the core
governance of the organization however, the same does not necessarily hold true. The
capacity for Boards to reason together is largely predicated on their shared understanding
of the established core values o f the hospital and their expected commitment to keep
them at the forefront o f the decision-making process. Once we start moving away from
the core o f the organization, however, we gradually depart from the absolute centrality of
these established values to the moral reasoning that informs conscience.
Just as a circular ripple o f water emanating from a central pointrof impact gradually
dissipates and looses force the further it travels from the core, so too might the
established values of the hospital. Although we recognize the broader ripples as
belonging to the initial point of impact within an otherwise calm lake, as the ripples grow
in diameter, they become more removed from this point and are less influenced by it.
Similarly, as we expand from the core governance structure of the organization, it
becomes less likely that the values of the hospital will maintain the same strength or force
as they do at the Board level. It is more likely, as we move from governance to bedside,
that individuals will include and incorporate personal and professional values (i.e., those
values strongly influenced by subculture, previous life experience etc...) into their daily
- ■
■
"
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understanding and judgments o f conscience. This trend will appear regardless of whether
the hospital has a religious affiliation.
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Consider the results o f a recent study comparing the content and mission-related
performance of Canadian hospitals (Bart, 2007):

» \

While the faith-based institutions in this study appear to excel in gamering
significantly higher levels of emotional conviction to their missions, they fail to
capture the same degree of advantage over their secular counterparts when it
comes to keeping the mission ‘front and centre’ as a decision making tool (p.688).
In other words, ,while members of Catholic hospitals tended to express a greater
emotional commitment to the hospital’s mission, these hospitals struggled just as much as
secular ones in having mission statements guide ‘day-to-day decision-making’ (Bart,
2007). While individuals working within the hospital, by virtue of agreeing to work there,
will likely have adopted and integrated the values of the hospital into their own value
systems to some degree, for many these values will not be core values - those most
central to the deliberations of conscience - as opposed to perimeter or peripheral values,
which are still important to the moral decision-making process but successively less so
than values at the core (See
Figure 1).
I use the terms perimeter
and peripheral here to illustrate
incremental differences

;

between those values closer to
our core and those further
away. Furthermore, given
the existence o f multiple
subcultures within

Figure 1. Relationship between core, perim eter &
peripheral Values
,
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organizations and the desperate need for health care providers across the country, even if
one argued that to work at a hospital an employee’s core values should align with those
of the organization, it is unlikely the values o f all staff would precisely mirror those o f
their employer. Moreover, even if one’s core values did accurately align with those of the
hospital, it is further unlikely, considering differences in individuals’ perimeter and
peripheral values, that each verdict of conscience across an organization would be the
same.
To elaborate, in as much as organizational values may inspire an understanding of
oneself as a hospital employee, each person will bring with them their own values and
experiences, which, to varying degrees, must be balanced with those-of the hospital. This
is not to say organizational values are unimportant to the everyday deliberations of staff.
Simply put, while we may work for an organization, and even agree with many of its
values, at the end of the day, the values that will remain at the forefront of our decision
making process will be those most central to our own integrity and self-concept. Given
the diversity o f core values that exist, as individuals integrate the values of the hospital
into their practice, they will inevitably do so in different ways and to different extents. It
is therefore not surprising, that individuals throughout an organization will interpret and
apply organizational values differently, thus leading to variations in deliberations and
judgments of conscience across the hospital.
As I ’ve said, however, there may also be cases where the core values of a hospital and
of an employee align. Indeed an individual may have opted to join a particular
organization because of its espoused values, or after having worked there for a period of
time, find that their values have become those of the organization. Unfortunately though,
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even the alignment of core values does not ensure that verdicts of conscience will be the
same. To illustrate my. point, consider once again the core values o f St. Joseph’s Health
Care, London - Respect, Excellence, and Compassion (St. Joseph’s Health Care, London,
2010) - viewed this time in the context of an ethical dilemma where two hypothetical
staff are asked to administer increasing amounts of morphine to a dying patient. For the
sake o f argument, I will assume that the core values of both staff members align with
those of the hospital, but that the staff members differ in their perimeter and peripheral
values. Thus, both value respect, excellence, and compassion, but at the same time, one
sees the administration of potentially lethal amounts of morphine as being permissible
and the other does not. Looking more closely, the first staff member sees the high doses
of morphine as respecting the patient’s dignity by easing his pain and suffering. Although
she understands it may hasten death by suppressing the respiratory system, the intention
of administering the morphine is to ensure the patient’s comfort. In administering the
medication, the first staff member - informed by perimeter and peripheral values about
beneficence (e.g., the reduction o f pain and suffering) and the preservation of dignity
during this difficult time - believes she is acting in the best interests of the patient and
thus providing excellent and compassionate care. Conversely, our second staff member
interprets the administration of these high doses o f morphine as potentially compromising
the sanctity of life and violating the principle of non-maleficence. In this case, despite the
fact that the morphine will ease some of the patient’s pain, it will also have the
unacceptable effect of hastening his death. Therefore, for the second staff member, the
proposed actions - informed by perimeter and peripheral standards about non-maleficence
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- and the sanctity of life - are not in line with the respectful and compassionate delivery of
care.

.

In the previous example both staff members are convinced they are accurately
promoting the core values of the hospital. However, as a result of their conscience, each
is compelled to follow an opposite path. This scenario reinforces how the deliberations
and verdicts o f conscience can be unique, despite individuals possessing the same core
values. Core values can also come to mean different things when informed by different
perimeter and peripheral values. Once again we are reminded of the diversity of
conscience within organizations, and this time how a person’s perimeter and peripheral
values can play into it.

•
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In this way, although Sulmasy (2008) and Gallagher and Goodstein (2002) argue that
the shared understanding of a hospital’s governance Board permit it to reflect on
situations in the manner of a collective agent, the truth is that these people represent only
a small number of those operating within the organization. As we expand to encapsulate
the efforts o f the broader organizational community, we see that a greater proportion of
people within it are not working as a collective reflective agent, but rather as individual
agents working to preserve or promote inner unity, or unity between their values and
those of the hospital in unique ways.

2.3.3.2 The Board Level
s Having explored the interpretation and application of hospital values at the individual
HCP/employee level, I now turn to the Board level. Here, I question whether it is enough
to say that because Board members have a common understanding of the organization’s

43
values, and together reach common decisions, that their deliberations afford them, and
thereby the hospital, the one mindedness necessary for a collective conscience. In as
much as Board members, adhering to the same core values, might arrive at a collective
decision, the reasons why each individual agreed to the decision can be strikingly
different. In other words, when we look more closely, our ripple analogy seems to fall
apart; even at the Board level, the core of the organization, the epicenter o f the ripple,
things are not completely unified.
As an example, let us examine a Board deliberating about dishonesty. Let us also say
that during this deliberation, the unequivocal answer from all members was that lying is
wrong. Indeed the final answer to any question is important, but what might be even
more telling when examining conscience is the deeper reasoning behind its verdicts.
Returning to our example, let us probe further into the reasons why Board members
might decide that lying is wrong:
1) God says so,
2) It violates a categorical moral imperative,
3) Deception contradicts the values of the medical profession,
4) It produces undesirable consequences
Although the example is relatively simple, it makes a clear point. Each o f these
justifications produces the same result - dishonesty is wrong - but the justifications differ.
The decision-makers arrive at a collective verdict, but not for the same reasons. The
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reasoning that informs conscience differs from one person to the next. There is no
collective cognitive agency.
By concentrating on the final answer to a question, we neglect important information
that hides beneath the surface. When small, seemingly insignificant details about the
question change, a previously established consensus could fall apart. This is especially
true in health care, where the weighing and balancing of values is a frequent, exceedingly
complex, and an ever-evolving process. Looking once again at our example, what answer
might our Board members give if the parameters were slightly changed? That is, instead
of simply asking whether lying was wrong, they were asked whether lying in order to
save a patient’s life was wrong. This time, we might see some disagreement. Although
Board members with reasons 1) and 2) above might continue to disapprove of lying, in
light o f the changes to the question, Board members with reasons 3) and 4) might
reconsider their verdict. Let us look more closely at each possibility:
1) Lying violates God’s eighth commandment (“You shall not bear false witness
against your neighbor” (The Holy See, n.d., A traditional catechetical formula,
; 8)). Therefore, this Board member may choose to abide by his original decision.
Alternatively, he could permit lying in this context, because not doing so may
cause him to indirectly violate the fifth commandment (“You shall not kill” (The
Holy See, n.d., A traditional catechetical formula, U 5)).

2) A categorical moral imperative is absolute and unconditional. This Board member
will definitely continue to view lying as wrong.
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3) Not lying would violate the Hippocratic oath - above all, do no harm. In this
situation, this Board member will permit lying.

4) In this case, the death of the patient as a result of not lying will likely produce
more undesirable consequences than those caused by lying. Thus, this Board
member will likely allow lying.
The slight change in question will cause most Board members to ponder again the ethics
of lying, and for members with reasons 3) and 4) (and possibly 1)), to alter their verdicts
entirely. This exercise suggests that the consensus of a group does not necessarily come
from a collective cognitive agent; the consensus can disguise differences in moral
justification that come to the surface once the topic o f discussion changes only slightly.
Because deliberations o f conscience are subjective, there will presumably be
differences (big and small) among agents as each o f them applies different values to a
situation or weighs different values differently. There may also be differences within
individual agents themselves, as values are reassessed over time. Therefore, although it
might be tempting initially to view the decisions of Boards as those of a collective
cognitive agent, upon closer examination we see that this perception is false. Instead,
individuals at all levels of an organization such as a hospital, engage in moral reflection
in an individual fashion.

.

Thus, I contend that hospitals do not satisfy the third criterion for conscience. In
addition, because each criterion is individually necessary for conscience, hospitals
automatically fail on the larger scale. Assuming that my argument is correct, I could end
the analysis here and reliably conclude that hospitals do not possess a conscience. But
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since my argument might be flawed, I will move on to consider how hospitals fair with
respect to the remaining two criteria.

2.3.4 Criterion Four - Affective Agency
In order for hospitals to have the affective agency needed for conscience, they must
possess the capacity to experience shame and guilt. Unfortunately, according to Campbell
(1957) (as cited in Haskar, 1998), the inner life that permits individual persons to
experience pleasant or unpleasant emotions is precisely what robots, corporations,
governments and other similar entities lack.
[For] even if they instantiate rational systems or functional systems such that it
makes sense to attribute actions ... to them, they do not haveTan irreducible inner
phenomenology. Thus a corporation or state is not joyous and does not suffer (in
the phenomenological sense) except in the sense that is reducible to the suffering
and joys o f its members (Haskar, 1998, The inner life and the Kantian view
section, '] 4).
............
,
From this perspective, hospitals cannot have the mental states required for affective :
agency. In “contrast to the healthcare professionals” that work within hospitals (Wicclair,
2011, p. 130), hospitals themselves cannot experience feelings of physical or emotional
distress, nor can they experience the effects of guilt or shame at the prospect o f a
fundamental loss to th e ir‘moral integrity’.

*

^

While this perspective may indeed be correct, hospitals, like many organizations, are
inherently driven by their membership. As such, although hospitals, as artificial entities
of the law, may not possess emotions, it is worth considering whether hospitals as
collective moral agents can. In other words, can the feelings of those within the
organization amount to a collective or shared sense of guilt or shame sufficiently united
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- and reflective o f the entire organization that we can say the organization feels guilt or
shame?
Most authors currently writing in favour of the moral agency and conscience of
hospitals do not explicitly touch on whether institutions can feel guilt or shame, though
one might reasonably assume that if they had, they would have pointed to the possibility
of a collective sense o f guilt or shame within the institution.^ This possibility arises, for
example, when people who are affiliated with a hospital feel guilt by association when
the hospital makes bad decisions. Consider the case of hematologist Dr. Nancy Olivieri.
In 1998, after publishing negative results on a drug she was testing, Dr. Olivieri was
subject to public attempts to discredit her reputation by the drug company funding the
clinical trial she was heading (Apotex), her employers (the Hospital for Sick Children &
the University of Toronto), and various individuals within them. Despite threats of legal
action and the lack of support from the Hospital and the University - both anticipating
continued funding from Apotex - Dr. Olivieri felt she had an ethical obligation to inform
her patients and the broader scientific community of the drug’s harmful effects. Dr.
Olivieri has since been vindicated, but in the years that followed the disclosure of her
findings, she was nonetheless subjected to continued reprisals from the organizations
involved (Olivieri, 2001; Thompson, Baird & Downie, 2001, 2005). In this case
employees o f the hospital could easily have felt guilt from being part of an organization
that acted in such a defamatory and negligent way. There also could easily have been a
collective sense of guilt within the organization.

.

■

I question, however, whether guilt by association is truly collective guilt, as opposed
to individual guilt that reflects not a collective bad conscience, but individual bad

i

'
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- consciences. Consider that the magnitude of guilt felt by the individuals involved will
presumably differ from one person to the next depending on: 1) their involvement; 2)
their role within the organization; and 3) their personal value framework (including
which o f their values are core vs. perimeter or peripheral).
Looking back at the Olivieri case, while there may be a minimal base sense of guilt
felt throughout the organization, individual experiences o f this guilt will vary. For
example, lay members may feel guilty for their association with the organization, but will
feel less guilt than the administrators who had penned and authorized the defamatory
allegations against Dr. Olivieri. Similarly, colleagues who stood by Dr. Olivieri .
throughout her ordeal will feel quite differently than those who abandoned her during her
time o f need. Individuals’ personal values will also affect their level o f guilt. Those who
deeply value the hospital’s role as a protector of the public’s health may interpret the
situation differently than those who deeply value its role in promoting clinical research.
Value differences will also influence the pervasiveness of guilt felt across an
organization. Although in specific cases of gross and obvious misconduct by the
organization - such as in the case of Dr. Olivieri - there will probably be at least a base
level o f collective guilt/shame felt across the organization, in other cases, this may not be
true. Instead, we might see people at opposite ends of a spectrum on feeling guilt versus
feeling proud of the organization. A case in point would be that of Sister Margaret
McBride, a Catholic nun in the United States who was fired from the hospital’s ethics
committee where she worked and was subsequently excommunicated from the Roman
Catholic Church after she authorized the abortion o f an eleven-week-old fetus to save the
mother’s life (Kristof, 2010). In this case, some employees firmly supported the
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. institution’s decision and felt guilty that such a procedure had been performed in their
place o f work. Conversely, others were appalled that such action would be taken against
Sister McBride, because what she did conformed to the Church’s doctrine o f double
effect. These staff felt guilty that their place of employment took such severe action
against Sister McBride. As we see, organizations can be significantly divided, which
prevents there from being collective guilt, at least across the organization.
Thus, although at times they may be similar, the emotions o f those within an
organization can vary considerably from one person to the next, which means that there is
not the united manifestation of emotion that is necessary for collective affective agency.
As we will soon see, these differences among individuals will:alsojiffect the possibility
for collective sanctioning within the organization.

‘

.

2.3.5 Criterion Five - Internal Sanctioning
As a final requirement for conscience, the entity in question must ultimately be
subject to internal sanctioning, whereby feelings of shame and guilt are self imposed and
internally mediated. Once again, while authors writing on the subject do not make
explicit reference to the ability of such organizations to engage in forms o f internal
sanctioning, they do speak o f hospitals as moral agents subject to moral punishment.
Therefore, in as much as hospitals are moral agents responsible for their actions and
inactions, so too are they worthy of praise, blame, and the imposition of sanctions
(Gallagher & Goodstein, 2002; Sulmasy, 2008). These sanctions may come in various
forms, and by virtue of a hospital’s role within society, may be the result of impediments
to the law, intemal/extemal policy standards, political will, etcetera. It is improbable,
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- however, that hospitals would possess the ability to adequately sanction themselves
internally in a manner that would be representative of conscience.

^^

Hospitals, I argue, can only be sanctioned externally or rely on those who work
within the organization to either sanction one another or submit to the sanctions of their
own consciences. But to mirror individual conscience, it must be the hospital sanctioning
itself. This is an important element of conscience as its fundamental role is that of an
internal mediator whose verdicts are limited to the self and remain distinct from the
judgments or sanctions imposed by others. Consequently, the pressure o f negative public
opinion, legal, or external policy sanctions could not count as legitimate sanctions of
institutional conscience. To be sure, a conscience may internalize and later incorporate
cues from the external environment into its assessment o f individual moral
blameworthiness. Its verdicts, however, will necessarily reflect the subjective experiences
and values o f the individual.

^

Moreover, penalties meted out after employee disciplinary hearings or the like do not
obviously count as sanctions of conscience, because conscience can tell the employee
who is punished that she is, in fact, blameless. Individuals can maintain a clear
conscience, while being found to have violated established corporate policies or even the
law. Well-known examples include those of Jack Kevorkian regarding his provision of
assisted suicide in the United States (“Jack Kevorkian”, n.d.); the experience of Dr.
■;
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Henry Morgentaler regarding his administration of abortions in Canada during the 1970’s
.
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and 1980’s (“Abortion crusader”, 2009); as well as the case of Robert Latimer, a
Saskatchewan farmer convicted of second-degree murder in 1994 for what he maintains
was the ‘mercy killing’ o f his severely handicapped daughter, Tracy (“Compassionate
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- homicide”, 2009; “Latimer still defends”, 2011). In each of these cases the defendants
maintained a clear and unaltered conscience and probably believed that they would have
suffered a worse fate at the hands of their own conscience had they not acted as they did.
In short, legal sanctions are not sanctions of conscience because they are externally
imposed and do not reflect each person’s internal deliberations.
While I have established that external sanctions and those imposed by others do not
clearly count as sanctions of conscience, the question begs to be asked, what of the
possibility o f a collective sanctioning of conscience? Fortunately the question seems to
have already been answered. If guilt, shame, or responsibility is not collective, then there
can be no hope o f collective sanctioning. And if there is no collective sanctioning, there
can be no collective conscience. Building upon the discussions about the previous
criteria, I argue there is a lack of compelling evidence that individuals within hospitals
experience guilt or responsibility collectively. Moreover, the differences in how they will
sanction themselves preclude the possibility of a collective conscience.

!; .

2.4 Conclusion
2.4.1 Summary of Findings
Having reviewed the elements necessary for conscience, it seems conclusive the
dominant view does not support the contention that hospitals possess a conscience.
Although they were moderately successful in fulfilling criteria one and two, hospitals
cannot adequately fulfill criteria three, four, and five, and consequently fail to possess a
conscience.
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With respect to criterion one, we saw that hospitals could qualify as moral agents that
are collective in nature. However, in light of the evidence presented about criteria three,
four, and five, whether hospitals fully meet the criterion o f moral agency is now in doubt.
(Recall that criteria two to five all discuss capacities that are elements of moral agency.)
At least some hospitals fulfilled criterion two: those that possess well-developed and
fully-integrated mission statements could claim to have an established set of values which
contribute to the formation o f their identity. In criterion three, hospitals were assessed not
to meet the necessary requirements, as they do not function as collective cognitive agents.
Discussion about criterion four revealed that hospitals do not reliably exhibit the truly
unified and collective sense of guilt and shame necessary for collective affective agency.
Finally, with respect to criterion five, it was determined that hospitals do not possess the
ability to impose upon themselves internal sanctions.
From these findings we see that at the very least, hospitals do not meet three o f the
five criteria for conscience. Given that candidates for conscience must fulfill all of the
criteria, we can reliably say that hospitals do not possess a conscience, as conscience is
understood according to the dominant view of conscience in bioethics.

2.4.2 Future Focus
Some readers might disagree with me about whether hospitals can possess a
conscience, perhaps because they do not accept the dominant view. (They might accept
instead a Catholic view of conscience.) All readers should agree, however, that
possessing a conscience does not automatically engender a right or entitlement to make
objections based upon it, or to have those objections respected in all circumstances. Thus,
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even if one assumes that hospitals qualify as having a conscience, one still must question
whether or to what degree they ought to receive conscience protection. Should Catholic
hospitals be permitted to conscientiously refuse to provide services within the context of
the Canadian health care system and in particular, within rural areas? This question will
be the focus of my next chapter.
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Chapter 3. Catholic Hospital Conscientious Objection
3.1

Introduction
It is a current practice in Canada that religiously affiliated hospitals may

conscientiously refuse to provide services, therapies, and procedures that contradict their
guiding religious values. They are generally permitted to do so on the grounds that failing
to uphold their guiding religious beliefs would compromise their identity and integrity
(Pellegrino, 2002; Sulmasy, 2008, Wildes, 1997). For Catholic hospitals, these beliefs are
informed by the principles outlined in the Health Ethics Guide (Catholic Health
Association of Canada (now Catholic Health Alliance of Canada) [CHAC], 2000), as
well as the general teachings established by the Roman Catholic Church (e.g., Humanae
Vitae (Paul IV, 1968), Donum Vitae (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 1987),
Dignitas Personae (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 2008)).
Prohibited or immoral interventions include: Abortion; sterilization (e.g., vasectomies
and tubal ligations) for birth control purposes; cryopreservation; artificial insemination by
a donor; in vitro fertilization; surrogacy; and “means that deliberately and intentionally
interfere with the procreative aspect in sexual intercourse” (CHAC, 2000, p.40, article
50). To varying degrees, these means can include refusals to dispense condoms11,
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11 Distributing condoms is a standard practice in public health for reducing the transmission o f HIV/AIDS
and Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs) (UNAIDS, United Nations Population Fund, World Health
Organization, 2009).
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.hormonal contraception, and emergency contraception (EC)

1'y

(CHAC, 2000).

Interestingly, final decisions relating to services that are and are not provided are often
made by the local Bishop (McGowan, 2005). Differences in opinion or interpretation by
local Bishops can lead to variability in services offered amongst Catholic hospitals across
the country.
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An important aspect o f any free and democratic society is respect for conscience. In
Chapter two, however, I argued against the view that such respect is warranted in the case
of hospitals, as they do not have a conscience according to the dominant view. Hospitals,
on this view, cannot conscientiously object in a legitimate manner. At the same time,
even if hospitals could be considered to be entities that have a conscience, continuing to
provide blanketed protection of their conscientious refusals may represent an
infringement on the personal autonomy o f individual Canadians, and in some cases,
impose significant barriers to accessing standard reproductive services. Refusals may also
unjustifiably compromise secular ethical principles, such as those of beneficence,
nonmaleficence, and justice.

A
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In contrast to the rich debate regarding the proper scope and limits of conscientious
refusals by individual health care professionals (HCPs), there is relatively little discussion
on the topic at the hospital level (Dickens & Cook, 2000; Fogel & Rivera, 2003, 2004;
Gallagher & Goodsetin, 2002; Gallagher, 1997; Pellegrino, 2002; Ryan, 2006; Sulmasy,12

12 EC is frequently administered as part o f the standards o f practice for treating sexual assault victims who
present at emergency departments (WHO, 2003; ACOG Committee on Practice Bulletins-Gynecology,

2010).
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- 2008; Wicclair, 2011; Wildes, 1997; Donovan, 1996; Sloboda, 2001). While certain
points of debate may be similar, there are a number of issues that require special attention
and analysis. The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether, and to what degree,
Catholic hospitals should be permitted to conscientiously refuse to provide reproductive
services that they morally oppose, within the context of the Canadian health care system
and in particular, within rural areas. I argue that, in as much as their refusals do not
disadvantage or impose significant burdens on individuals, the community, or other
hospitals and HCPs in the service area, Catholic hospitals may legitimately receive some
conscience protection. However, in cases where significant burdens, limitations, or
injustices are imposed, or where reasonable and timely access to services is
compromised, the protection of conscience is no longer ethically justified and limits on
those protections are necessary.

:. ^

;

I propose to fulfill my objective through a two-part analysis. First I will explore
reasons for believing that Catholic hospitals should continue to enjoy conscience
protection and second, I will explore reasons for believing that they should not. Through
my analysis, I conclude that in a number of important circumstances, the reasons against
protecting the conscientious refusals o f Catholic hospitals outweigh those in favour, and
that limitations on the conscientious objections of Catholic hospitals are warranted. I end
by summarizing these key points and suggesting situations in which limitations should be
imposed.
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3.2 Reasons in Favour of Protecting The Conscientious Refusals of
Catholic Hospitals
In the following paragraphs I will outline a number o f reasons in favour of protecting
the conscientious refusals o f Catholic hospitals and provide additional insight into their
importance.
One o f the most compelling reasons for allowing Catholic hospitals continued
freedom o f conscience, and one highlighted by Wicclair (2011), is the possibility that not
permitting them this freedom may cause their withdrawal from health care altogether.
From their perspective, Catholic hospitals are promoting the greater good by protecting
their own integrity (and from their point of view, that o f the general public as well) by. not
allowing acts that they view to be immoral to occur. Permitting presumed immoral acts to
occur under their jurisdiction would not only compromise their fundamental religious
beliefs, but signify formal cooperation

i 'l

in evil practices and full moral complicity in the

illicit act (CHAC, 2000). Being party to these practices may also signify explicit approval
of the objectionable services, sending conflicting messages to Catholics and the broader13

13 According to the Health Ethics Guide (CHAC, 2000), the principle o f cooperation “applies to situations
where an action involves more than one person, and sometimes when the persons have different intentions.
It is unethical to cooperate fo rm a lly with an immoral act, i.e. directly to intend the evil act itself. But
sometimes it may be an ethical duty to cooperate m aterially [also termed legitimate cooperation] with an
immoral act, i.e. one does not intend the evil effects, but only the good effects, when only in this way can a
greater harm be prevented” (p.13-14). For example, when done to save the mother’s life, one may consider
ending an ectopic pregnancy an act o f legitimate cooperation. In this case, the intention is to preserve the
mother’s life, while the termination o f the pregnancy is seen as an unfortunate and necessary requirement
for doing so.

58
society regarding what is and is not, morally permissible. Instead of compromising their
identity and integrity, Catholic hospitals may instead choose to close their doors entirely.
Unfortunately, as Wicclair (2011) highlights, the most vulnerable would likely
experience the most detrimental effects o f this decision. “Moreover, in some
communities, the closing o f one health care facility [could] substantially reduce
convenient access to health services for all residents” (Wicclair, 2011, p.132), thus
placing a higher burden on an already over-extended health care system and leaving other
hospitals to absorb the backlash. Given the potentially severe consequences of not
allowing Catholic hospitals to conscientiously object, it is important to examine reasons
for believing Catholic hospitals are important and why we may value their continued
involvement in health care.

.

First, it is essential to acknowledge the significant contributions Catholic hospitals
have made throughout the years to both the Canadian health care system, and to the
health o f countless individual Canadians (Humbert, 2004). By not allowing Catholic
hospitals to continue operating within the Canadian health care system as Catholic
hospitals not only are we devaluing their legacy and commitment, past and present, but
we also fail to preserve and respect them into the future.

:

:

;

Second, with experience also comes a great deal of expertise. Like many religious
enterprises, Catholic hospitals are especially committed to delivering health care that is
not only inspired by the ‘healing ministry’ o f Jesus Christ, but that also nurtures the
physical, mental, and social well being o f patients and staff, in a manner that treats
everyone with dignity, compassion, and respect (CHAC, 2000; McGowan, 2005). Since
the establishment of the first hospital in North America by the Soeurs of the Augestines

.
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-Hospitalières in 1639 (Hotel-Dieu, located in Quebec City, Quebec) (Humbert, 2004),
Catholic hospitals have provided a number o f necessary and beneficial health care
services across the country. In so doing, they have amassed a wealth of knowledge
pertaining to various aspects o f hospital administration and health care delivery, while
also leading the way in many areas of health care, including palliative care (Morrison,
Maroney-Galin, Kralovec, Meier, 2005). Given their depth o f expertise and their
innovative approach to certain health care practices (e.g., palliative care), we can
continue to learn a great deal from Catholic hospitals. If Catholic hospitals withdrew
from health care this opportunity for cooperative learning and knowledge exchange could
be lost.

In a 2011 article focusing on the objections of Catholic hospitals to dispense EC to
rape victims in the United States, Mark Wicclair14 highlights several additional reasons
why we might consider continuing to allow Catholic hospitals to conscientiously object.
First, “it can be important to physicians, nurses, pharmacists, and other personnel to be
able to practice and work in a community that shares a commitment to a core set of goals,
values, and principles” (Wicclair, 2011, p. 131). Wicclair (2011) continues to explain that
for some people, simply working in an organization that permits actions that violate their
core values could compromise their moral integrity and lead to significant moral distress.

14 Note. In this same article Mark Wicclair (2011) goes on to argue that despite their claims o f identity and
integrity, Catholic hospitals have an obligation to “ensure that rape victims, no matter their age, who
present at the ED [emergency department] have an opportunity to receive information about EC without
delay and have timely and convenient access to it if they decide to take it” (p.136).
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-In order to avoid such distress, some people may choose to work in an environment
where they would be able to avoid such situations. In a case where the alternative is for
the HCP to move, or discontinue practicing all together (both o f which would result in a
loss to the community), one could argue that having Catholic hospitals serves a greater
good.

Second, it can be “important to patients to receive care in a facility that is committed
to their fundamental values” (Wicclair 2011, p.131). Thus for some, knowing one’s
values are reflected in those o f the hospital where one receives treatment, can be
reassuring and help alleviate stress. Third, “even when they are not hospital or nursing
home patients, members o f a faith community may have an interest-in the existence of
hospitals that exemplify its fundamental principles” (Wicclair, 2011, p.131). For
Catholics, administering to the sick and suffering is an important aspect o f their Christian
mission and is an essential part of living out their faith in a modem society (CHAC,
2000; McGowan, 2005).

Fourth, Wicclair (2011) suggests that one could claim - with the notable exception of
certain outliers such as the Nazi regime - that “the existence of hospitals dedicated to
upholding perceived moral ideals is intrinsically valuable” (p.131), and that a society
wherein such moral ideals can be freely promoted is a better society for it. Fifth, such
hospitals could be interpreted as important to the maintenance and encouragement of
religious diversity (Wicclair, 2011). In fact, as previously stated, the hallmark of a free
and democratic society is its nurturing and support of diversity.

Finally, “it might be claimed that insofar as such hospitals have a social mission,
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which is perhaps especially true o f religiously affiliated facilities, they promote social
justice and contribute to social welfare” (Wicclair, 2011, p.131). This may be particularly
true in the American context (in which Wicclair writes), where Catholic hospitals often
assume care for those who lack health insurance and those who do not have the resources
to pay for services out of pocket (Catholics for a free choice [CFFC], 2005). His
statement is also relevant to the Canadian context, as the preferential treatment o f the
poor and marginalized remains a central value of Catholic health care (CHAC, 2000;
McGowan, 2005). Respect for social justice and welfare might have been what led the
Soeurs o f the Augestines Hospitalières to first recognize, centuries ago, the need for
public health care (Humbert, 2004).
Given the many positive contributions Catholic hospitals have made and continue to
make, as well as the potentially severe consequences of not allowing them to
conscientiously object, any decision to limit or disallow their objections must be taken
seriously. One must also soberly assess such a decision against what communities, as
well as the broader health care system, stand to gain by limiting the ability of Catholic
hospitals to conscientiously refuse and what they stand to lose through the imposition of
those same limitations.

3.3 Reasons For Imposing Limits on The Conscientious Refusals of
Catholic Hospitals
While there are certainly reasons to continue protecting the conscientious refusals of
Catholic hospitals, there are also a number o f important reasons for imposing restrictions
on these same refusals. In short, just as HCPs are not permitted ‘carte blanche’ when
conscientiously refusing, nor should Catholic hospitals. In the following section I will
discuss reasons why we might limit the ability of Catholic hospitals in Canada to make
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conscientious objections. I will explore five main points: the concept of health care as a
socially-mediated and public enterprise, the potential imposition of beliefs on individuals
and its effect on autonomy, the use of public funds, the imbalance o f conscience, and the
creation of barriers to access.

;

3.3.1 Health Care as a Socially-Mediated & Public Enterprise
The first reason for placing limits on the refusals of Catholic hospitals relates to the
special status o f health care as a highly valued and socially-mediated service and the
reciprocal obligations that ensue when endeavouring to provide these services.
In contrast to the American health care system, the Canadian health care system is
largely predicated on a more socialized distribution and delivery o f care (Fisher, 2009;
Romanow, 2002). Indeed, for many Canadians, the system’s shared values of “equity,
fairness, and solidarity” (Romanow, 2002, p.xvi), have come to define “their
understanding o f citizenship” (Romanow, 2002, p.xvi) and in many respects what it
means to be Canadian. As outlined by the Honorable Roy Romanow (2002):
Canadians consider equal and timely access to medically necessary health care
services on the basis of need as a right of citizenship, not a privilege of status or
wealth. Building from these values, Canadians have come to view their health
care system as a national program, delivered locally but structured on
intergovernmental collaboration and a mutual understanding of values. They want
and expect their governments to work together to ensure that the policies and
programs that define medicare remain true to these values (p. xvi).
This passage highlights the importance Canadians attribute to the equitable and timely
access o f health care services. It also reinforces that, although health care is not a legal or
constitutional right, Canadians have come to understand it as such, or in the very least,
view it as an important social service that should be protected.
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By committing to provide health care as a publicly mediated service however,
governments also assume the responsibility of ensuring the relevant health care needs of
society are reasonably met. For in as much as a ‘good’ (in this case health care) has been
shielded from certain pressures of the market, a level of competition and the ability for
consumers to exercise direct purchasing power over the services they want and need have
been removed15. In other words, because the publicly funded system in Canada is the
only option, it must meet the needs of the population it serves in a timely manner, or risk
being rendered unconstitutional (Kirby & LeBreton, 2002b). This was largely the issue in
the case o f Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General) (2005). Although constitutional law
does not generally recognize positive rights, such as a right to health care, it does protect
certain negative rights (Kirby & LeBreton, 2002b) - such as the right to life, liberty, and
security o f the person as outlined in section 7 o f the Canadian Charter o f Rights and
Freedoms (1982). It is in this respect that challenges to the availability o f health care
services, such as in the cases o f R. v. Morgentaler (1988) and Chaoulli v. Quebec
(Attorney General) (2005), could be raised. In both these cases, delays in treatment and
availability were determined to give rise to situations where severe psychological and
physical suffering could compromise the security o f the person. As Supreme Court
Justices McLachlin and Major, in the case of Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General)

15 In saying this I do not pretend that Canadians are unable to have their wants and needs recognized by the
health care system. Indeed voting in governmental elections, participating in opinion polls or governmental
round tables (such as those held by the Romanow commission), and joining lobby groups/associations
focused on specific health needs, are each ways o f having one’s voice heard. What I am saying, however, is
that individuals are removed from d irectly determining market interests simply by their purchasing power.
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(2005), write:
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The primary objective o f the Canada Health Act, K S.C . 1985, c. C-6, is “to
protect, promote and restore the physical and mental well-being o f residents of
Canada and to facilitate reasonable access to health services without financial or
other barriers” (s. 3). By imposing exclusivity and then failing to provide public
health care o f a reasonable standard within a reasonable time, the government
creates circumstances that trigger the application of s. 7 of the Charter 105).
While each o f these cases deals with particular situations and interpretations of Charter
rights, taken as a whole they help to clarify what Canadians can reasonably expect from
their health care system. That is, although there is no specific legal right to health care in
Canada, by undertaking the role of providing socially-mediated health care services, that
have the overall effect of a government monopoly, these same governments are
responsible for ensuring, within reason, that the health care needs of Canadians are
adequately met. For their part, Canadians can reasonably expect not to be unduly delayed
or burdened in accessing these services. Furthermore, one could argue that because
Canadians interpret health care to be a general right (even though technically it is not),
there is an added element o f responsibility on governments (and by extension providers)
to ensure services properly reflect the public’s needs.
In the same way governments have a responsibility to ensure health care services are
congruent with the health needs o f Canadians, hospitals, by extension, have similar
obligations to both the governments who grant them this ability and to the society, whom
they serve. In a 2006 article on the reciprocal obligations o f pharmacists and pharmacy
licensees, which similarly applies to hospitals, Mark Wicclair argues that those who have
been granted a monopoly by relevant licensing authorities are afforded such licenses with
the understanding that they will uphold relevant standards and practices, and promote
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specific ends. In the case o f pharmacies, and o f hospitals, these ends relate to ensuring
“the public health, safety, and welfare” (Wicclair, 2006, p.228). Therefore, in as much as
licenses are granted with the expectation that certain relevant requirements to the public
will be met (e.g., for Canadian hospitals, administering to the needs of the population
they serve),,in freely accepting such a license, licensees agree to meet them. This is what
Wicclair (2006) terms the ‘social contract obligation’, as failing to meet the outlined
terms is a failure to uphold one’s commitments to the licensure as well as to society. In a
similar respect, Wicclair (2006) notes that an obligation to promote the goals of the
health care system can also follow from requirements o f reciprocal justice. In this case,
licensees who enjoy specific rights and privileges have a reciprocal obligation to ensure
the terms o f their license are met, otherwise “they do not merit the rights and privileges
associated with [the] license” (Wicclair, 2006, p.229). Because Catholic hospitals have
freely chosen to provide health care services as part of the public system, and have been
granted the regulated (and largely monopolistic) authority to do so, they have a social
contract and a reciprocal justice obligation to ensure that the requirements of the
governments who ‘license’ them, and the needs of the population they serve are met. In
cases where these obligations are not met, limitations may be warranted.16
In urban areas where reasonable access to reproductive services can be maintained by

16 Although licenses can engender obligations in a private system, the obligations on licensees in a public
health care system are arguably even greater as organizations have freely agreed to participate in providing
a publicly mediated service that must reflect (within reason) the needs o f the general service population. In
these circumstances organizations such as hospitals have an even greater obligation to serve public interests
because they are public enterprises.

'
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- local hospitals or facilities in close proximity, deferring a Catholic hospital’s
responsibility to provide reproductive services may be permissible. In these contexts,
while Catholic hospitals continue to fulfill their obligations to governments and the
community in other areas of health care, the public safety and welfare are met through the
general availability of reproductive services elsewhere. Refusals by Catholic hospitals
will not likely impose significant burdens on the community and may be justified.
Furthermore, by maintaining a certain level of flexibility in situations where reproductive
services are otherwise reasonably available, we are establishing an environment of
mutual respect wherein Catholic hospitals are not unnecessarily made to provide services
to which they morally oppose.

,
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In rural areas however, where availability o f reproductive services cannot be
reasonably met within the vicinity, deferring the responsibility of Catholic hospitals to
provide these services may no longer be justified. In these contexts, even though Catholic
hospitals continue to provide a variety o f services, their obligations to meet the needs of
the community, combined with a lack o f general availability to reproductive services that
meet these needs, may require them (Catholic hospitals) to provide these services.
Otherwise they may impose significant burdens on the community and fail to meet
government responsibilities to promote the public health safety and welfare. They may
also trigger claims under section 7 o f Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms (1982).

3.3.2 The Imposition of Beliefs & the Effect on Autonomy
As the potential for the refusals of Catholic hospitals to impose their religious beliefs
on patients who do not share these beliefs increases, so does the justification for imposing
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- limits on these same refusals.

A guiding principle in medical ethics is respect for autonomy. Consistent with this
principle, individuals should be permitted to make decisions and to act on their own
accord free from the constraints of others (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009). According to
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists’ (ACOG) Committee on Ethics
(2007),
To respect a patient’s autonomy is to respect her capacities and perspectives,
including her right to hold certain views, make certain choices, and take certain
actions based on personal values and beliefs. Respect for autonomy has particular
importance in reproductive decision making, which involves private, personal,
and often pivotal decisions about sexuality and childbearing (p. 1205).
When conscientiously objecting Catholic hospitals impose their moral beliefs on patients
who do not share these beliefs, respect for the patient’s autonomy is undermined.
Canadians expect hospitals, within reason, to provide medically indicated and
generalized services that reflect the community’s health care needs. Reproductive
services are among these services and are often highly valued. In a US national survey
conducted by Belden, Russonello, and Stewart (2000) a majority of women polled
believed that community hospitals should provide a broad range of reproductive services.
More specifically, regardless of an institution’s affiliation with the Roman Catholic
Church, a majority of women wanted their hospital to offer: medically indicated
abortions17 (general 87%; Catholics 86%; strongly religious Catholics (SRCs) 82%), birth
control pills (general 91%; Catholics 90%; SRCs 82%), sterilization procedures (general

■7 Medically indicated abortions are defined as abortions provided when the woman’s life or health is in
danger (Belden, Russonello and Stewart, 2000).
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85%; Catholics 77%; SRCs 67%), and morning-after pills for rape victims (general 78%;
Catholics 76%; SRCs 68%) (Belden, Russonello & Stewart, 2000). In addition, 50% of
women in general, 48% o f Catholics, and 38% of SRCs, expressed support for a
community hospital that performs elective abortions when the health of the woman is not
at risk, over a hospital that does not provide this service (Belden, Russonello & Stewart,
2000). While equivalent statistics are not available in Canada, reports suggest that
approximately: 74% of Catholics in Canada believe “the doctrine of the Catholic Church
regarding things such as abortion [and] contraception... is dated and out of sync with the
times” (CFFC, 2004, p.23); 68 % believe the “church should abandon its opposition to
the use of contraception”(CFFC, 2004, p.l 1); and 72% and 46% respectively believe that
abortion is ‘not wrong at all’ or ‘wrong only sometimes’ if a fetus has serious defects
(72%) or if a family has a very low income (46%)(CFFC, 2004).
These statistics point not only to the general desire of individuals to access
reproductive services, but to a considerable desire from Catholics to do the same. The
findings also suggest that Catholics are not homogeneous in their views, and that many
disagree with the official position of the Roman Catholic Church on reproductive issues.
It would be misleading therefore to argue, even in cases where a hospital serves a
pervasively Catholic population, that reproductive services are not desired or warranted.
Furthermore, even if it were true that most Catholics in a community did not want their
hospital to provide certain reproductive services, in a publicly mediated health care
system, sacrificing the needs o f the few simply for the religious beliefs of the many is not
necessarily ethically justifiable. This is especially true when the sacrificed services are
easily provided by most hospitals and do not require specialized expertise or machinery
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or can be provided without significant financial costs. Such is the case for many
reproductive services including EC, sterilizations, and even abortions (both medically
indicated and elective)(Kaposy, 2010; Trussell, Wiebe, Shochet, Guilbert, 2001).
In health care systems where access to resources is limited, priorities must be
established. Optimizing scarce resources often requires centralizing specialized services
in urban centres (Romanow, 2002). Although it is unfortunate that those who live outside
these centres must travel outside their communities to access certain treatments (e.g.,
radiation treatment) and diagnostic tools (e.g., Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI)
machines), sustaining costly systems across a vast geography would be impractical and
place unreasonable financial burdens on the entire system. In the ca.se o f Catholic
hospitals however, decisions not to offer certain medically indicated reproductive
services are not based on financial limitations or a lack of highly specialized tools and
staff but instead on religious doctrine. Moreover, the values of the hospital may not align
with the values o f the patient seeking medical attention. In this respect, the degree to
which refusals by Catholic hospitals constitute an imposition of their beliefs on those
who do not share them warrants concern.
In urban areas other hospitals in the area will likely provide reproductive services that
the Catholic hospital does not. Therefore an acceptable level of access to these services
will most likely be maintained. The availability of services within the area means that
individuals can go elsewhere without facing significant burdens or impositions on their
autonomy. Access might be less convenient but is still available.
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Some circumstances that bring people to the hospital however, might be so
burdensome that something as simple as going elsewhere (even in an urban area) may be
physically or emotionally unmanageable. When a victim has already experienced severe
trauma, as in the case o f sexual assault, refusing applicable reproductive services would
only add to the stress of the situation. Providing EC for victims of sexual assault is a
standard medical practice (WHO, 2003; ACOG Committee on Practice BulletinsGynecology, 2010). Not providing EC, for those who want it, only limits their autonomy
and can further victimize already vulnerable individuals by increasing their risk for an
unwanted pregnancy and possible abortion. It may also expose individuals to having their
requests for EC made out to be immoral. In these situations Catholic hospitals may have
an obligation to provide EC, or at the very least facilitate the procurement of EC through
transportation assistance to a providing pharmacy or hospital. They should also have an
obligation to fully inform victims about EC so that they can make a fully informed and
autonomous decision about this option.
In rural areas, the conscientious refusals o f Catholic hospitals will also have a
significant impact on the ability for individuals within the community to equitably access
services as well as to exercise autonomy over their reproductive health decisions. In this
context, the conscientious refusals of Catholic hospitals comparative to availability of
services become highly pervasive. Instead o f one or two HCPs objecting it amounts to
hundreds, as each HCP must abide by the hospital’s conscientious refusal policies. When
hospitals are the sole providers for an area, the choice o f whether to go elsewhere is
effectively removed from the patient, thus diminishing their autonomy as well as their
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- ability to access medically indicated services. The hospital is now acting as the moral
compass of the community and as such, exercising a monopoly over a public service.
According to Alta Charo (2005) “claiming an unfettered right to personal autonomy
while holding monopolistic control over a public good constitutes an abuse of the public
trust” (p.2473). This is especially true if people expect to receive certain services and are
subsequently denied, simply because hospital policy forbids it on religious grounds, or if
people are not familiar with what is and is not provided within Catholic hospitals. For
instance Belden, Russonello & Stewart (2000) found that nearly half (45%) of the women
they polled believed that if admitted to a Catholic hospital, they would be provided with
the medical services they needed, even if those services contradictedCatholic teachings.
In addition, while most women were aware of Catholic restrictions'on abortions, few
knew that a broader range of reproductive services were also restricted. Only three
percent recognized that sterilizations were not provided and six percent knew that there
was no access to EC (Belden, Russonello & Stewart, 2000). In Canada, determining
which services are and are not provided at particular hospitals is further complicated by
the possibility for differences in interpretation o f the Health Ethics Guide (CHAC, 2000)
by various sponsors and Bishops.

....................

Women and men in rural areas that have secular services also enjoy more
reproductive autonomy than women in the community that has only a Catholic provider.
This is a form of discrimination. Even if you were aware of a Catholic hospital’s sole
provider status when moving to a community you might not be able to live elsewhere,
and if you were able to live elsewhere you would have to proactively anticipate which
services you think you would want or need in the future. This can be highly
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-unpredictable. What an individual thinks they might do in a situation and what they
actually choose to do in a situation can be very different (e.g., circumstances might lead
an individual to have an abortion who never thought she herself would elect to have such
a procedure).
The ability for hospitals to provide health care as a socially mediated good and then
for them to withdraw certain relevant and highly valued services for religious reasons
represents an abuse of power. In rural areas, this also represents an abuse of trust as
Catholic beliefs may be forced on those who do not share similar convictions while
simultaneously not including the opportunity to go elsewhere. In this environment the
potential burdens imposed on an individual’s autonomy are significant enough to warrant
limitations on the conscientious refusals of Catholic hospitals.

*

...

3.3.3 The Use of Public Funds
The third reason to consider imposing limitations on the conscientious refusals of
Catholic hospitals is that, like most hospitals in Canada, they are publicly funded. In fact,
in 2004, 92% of funding for hospitals came from the public sector (mostly through
provincial & federal taxes) (Canadian Institute for Health Information [CIHI], 2005). The
remaining 8% came from various sources, such as private insurance (e.g., for extra costs
associated with private rooms), ancillary fees (e.g., food services & parking), donations,
and investments (CIHI, 2005).
Simply stated, when a service is purchased with the taxpayer’s dollar it is no longer
the sole interests of the institution that should be promoted, but rather the needs and
values o f the public it serves. When organizations enter the public domain, they should
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play by public rules. In Canada, because hospitals are largely funded by the public purse,
hospitals have a reciprocal obligation to meet the public’s needs. Even when a hospital is
administered by a Catholic organization, public funds are allotted.
Churches, temples, mosques, and other religious institutions that are privately
governed, and who serve a specific subset of the population, do deserve to be reasonably
shielded from laws that would require them to contradict their religious beliefs (e.g.,
forcing the Catholic Church to preside over same sex marriages). Those who seek the
assistance of these institutions do so o f their own free will and can decide not to frequent
a particular place o f worship should they disagree with its beliefs. Hospitals on the other
hand are public pursuits and even when governed by religious organizations, they should
be expected to step outside their religious insulation to serve public demands. Because
Catholic hospitals are publicly funded, they cannot choose those whom they serve, nor
will they only serve Catholics. (Even if it was allowable to only serve Catholics, as
previously discussed, Catholics are not homogeneous in theirbeliefs regarding the
permissibility of different reproductive services [CFFC, 2004].)
Differences between the physician funding framework and the way hospitals are
funded may also be cause for imposing limits on the refusals of Catholic hospitals. In
contrast to the majority o f physicians in Canada who are reimbursed on a fee-for-service
basis, hospitals are allocated standard operating budgets, which they are expected to
distribute across their organization (CIHI, 2005). In most parts of the country, hospitals
are funded through regional or local health authorities. The amount of funding a hospital
receives is generally based on a combination of who is served (e.g., proportion o f seniors
in the area), the types of services provided (e.g., is the hospital a trauma centre vs. a
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- general hospital; number o f hip replacements, open heart surgeries, transplants
performed), how much the hospital spent in the past, and whether the hospital provides
services related to the government’s political platform (e.g., special funding may be
allocated for priority programs) (CIHI, 2005). Once a hospital’s funding is approved it is
generally responsible for allocating it as it sees fit. In this respect, while physicians are
not compensated for services they do not provide, hospitals will continue to receive
similar, if not the same, level of funding had they chosen to provide certain basic
reproductive services (e.g., EC, sterilizations, abortions). By refusing to provide these
services, not only are Catholic hospitals decreasing overall access to them, they are
reducing the financial flexibility of surrounding hospitals (since funds that could have
been allocated to these hospitals must be shared with Catholic hospjtals), while
simultaneously increasing the burden on these hospitals and their HCPs to provide
reproductive services more frequently.

.....................

Despite a Catholic hospital’s receipt of public funds, and the potential for increased
financial pressures on other hospitals, reasonable access to reproductive services within
urban areas will likely be maintained. By continuing to provide services to which they do
not object, Catholic hospitals are also helping to lower the demand for these services at
other hospitals. Furthermore, any additional burdens as a result of the Catholic hospital’s
conscientious refusal will most likely become diluted amongst other hospitals in the area
so that no one hospital or group of HCPs will be unreasonably burdened.
In rural areas where a Catholic hospital is an area’s sole provider or where accessing
another hospital would be excessively burdensome, limitations to a hospital’s refusals
may be necessary, unless reasonable and timely access to those services are made
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available to the community through alternate providers. By operating with public funds
and not providing basic reproductive services, Catholic hospitals once again exercise a
monopoly over a publicly mediated service. In rural areas individuals might not be able
to easily access another hospital, in which case the needs o f the population are not
adequately being met. Furthermore because there are fewer hospitals in rural areas
(Romanow, 2002; Kirby & LeBreton, 2002a; Fairbaim & Gustafson, 2008), each
hospital, assuming they are reasonably accessible, would be required to assume a
proportionally higher level o f burden in providing reproductive services, compared to
their urban counterparts. In this respect both individuals and hospitals in rural areas are
being disadvantaged and limits that minimize these disadvantages are necessary.

3.3.4 The Primacy of Conscience Imbalance
A fourth reason for imposing limits on the objections o f Catholic hospitals is for what
I call th e ‘primacy of conscience imbalance’.
If we accept that hospitals have a conscience, the question must be asked - is it
appropriate for the conscience o f a hospital to supersede an individual’s? I argue that it is
not. In fact, it contradicts the very idea o f conscience as a personal mediator, responsible
for one’s own integrity and inner unity and not that of others. For this reason, when the
conscience of a hospital is allowed to override an individual’s, an unacceptable
imbalance is created.
Health, as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO), is a state of “complete
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or
infirmity”(1946, p.l). Since contradicting one’s personal moral values can cause serious
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- psychological harm and emotional distress, not allowing professionals to heed their
conscience could result in serious health consequences.
When hospitals conscientiously object, they do so on the basis of religious doctrine
set out and passed down by sponsoring organizations. HCPs are therefore restricted in
their ability to necessarily follow the dictates of their own conscience, as they are
required to work within the ethical guidelines dictated and imposed by the sponsoring
organization’s religious beliefs. These guiding principles may not accurately represent
the values o f all those employed by the hospital. In order to preserve their conscience,
some employees may break the rules or resign (Freedman, Landy & Steinauer, 2008;
Yaworski, 2007) while others may be required to suffer the fragmenting of their
conscience in silence, as not working is simply not an option they would consider.
Conscientious refusals by Catholic hospitals represent an imposition of beliefs from
the top down simply because of the organization’s religious beliefs and not because an
intervention would contradict the values of medicine. Arguably the conscience of an
individual bears a significantly higher moral weight because of the risk to personal
health. Furthermore, as argued in Chapter two, hospitals do not possess affective agency
and therefore do not have the ability to experience the same fragmenting of integrity as
humans. Institutional objections based on hospital policy that constrict the moral views of
those who must subsequently enforce them impede autonomy and jeopardize the
potential well being o f HCPs who have different values18.

18 O f note these policies also limit the consciences o f patients (e.g. the conscience o f a woman telling her to
obtain an abortion). Although this is an important topic, in order to limit scope, in this section I concentrate
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While this imbalance is certainly true, it is also true that individuals do not have the
right to work for a specific organization. For example, I may love books and be an
excellent salesperson, but I cannot make a local Chapters, or the local public library, hire
me on these personal criteria alone simply because I want to work there. Nor can I force
them to continue employing me should I repeatedly contradict their policies. Therefore,
in urban areas, there may be a strong case for arguing that employees who disagree with
the Catholic approach to health care should practice in a hospital that more accurately
reflects their values. Finding a position in another hospital, or transferring to such a
position may not be easy, but given the high demand for qualified HCPs (Romanow,
2002; Kirby & LeBreton, 2002a), it will not likely be impossible. Individuals may also
need to be willing to take a job that is not in the department they initially want or were in
before as supporting diversity requires flexibility.

........

In rural areas however, or where the hospital is a region’s sole provider, HCPs have
less choice and flexibility in where they work. Given their specialized skills, and the HCP
shortage - especially in rural, remote, and northern areas (Romanow, 2002; Kirby &
LeBreton, 2002a; Fairbaim & Gustafson, 2008) if an individual is willing to work in their
profession they should be enabled to do so. In such cases, the autonomy of the HCP as
well as the hospital’s duty of beneficence towards society bear an added weight against
the ‘conscience’ of the hospital, as the HCP’s choice of where to practice is more
constrained, and losing the HCP would presumably negatively impact the community.

solely on the ethical implications o f the conscientious refusals o f employees to their employer’s
conscientious refusals.
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3.3.5 Barriers to Access

’

A fifth reason for imposing limits on the conscientious refusals of Catholic hospitals
is when they affect equitable access to reproductive services. In these cases obstacles
imposed can become so great that they surpass the status of a mere inconvenience and
become veritable barriers.

^ '

^

Defining access to health care is contingent upon multiple variables. What might
constitute reasonable access for one person may present considerable challenges for
another. Traveling to a hospital 45 minutes away will not likely present considerable
challenges for an individual with a car, whereas being forced to make the same trip when
reliant on public transportation can be exceptionally difficult. At times inequalities can
exist by virtue of their implications. When considering conscientious objections by
Catholic hospitals, we must consider the “degree to which [refusals] create or reinforce
an unfair distribution of the benefits of reproductive technology”(ACOG Committee on
Ethics, 2007, p. 1206) or access to medically indicated reproductive services. In this
respect, refusals that “unduly burden the most vulnerable of society violate the core
commitment of justice in the distribution of health resources” (ACOG Committee on
Ethics, 2007, p. 1206) and may need to be limited.
Barriers to access can present themselves differently depending on the individual’s
needs and their ability to address those needs. While similar barriers can exist in urban
areas, in rural communities a number of factors, including geographic distance and the
lack o f health care service options help to amplify the problem (Romanow, 2002; Kirby
& LeBreton, 2002a; Fairbaim & Gustafson, 2008). In rural communities where a
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- Catholic hospital is the sole service provider, or where a merger would confer upon a
hospital corporation sole provider status, barriers to access can become so great that
essential services are effectively denied.
A case in point was the removal of tubal ligations from the services provided by St.
Elizabeth’s Hospital in Humboldt, Saskatchewan, in 2006. If we recall, this procedure
was found to be contrary to the Health Ethics Guide (CHAC, 2000) and as such was
discontinued in the rural community, at first completely and then for birth control
purposes only (Yaworski, 2007). This decision limits autonomy and poses a risk to
female reproductive health. The ACOG recommends that an appropriate time for tubal
ligation is immediately following delivery (ACOG Committee on Practice BulletinsGynecology, 2003). Religious beliefs prohibiting sterilization for birth control purposes
may subject a woman to an unnecessary procedure at a different facility. This increases
the risk of infection, recovery time, cost to the health care system, personal
inconveniences, and risk of additional pregnancies until the procedure can be completed
(Fogel & Rivera, 2003).
Accessing health care services in a rural environment is challenging at best. When
limitations imposed by Catholic hospitals are added, challenges can quickly become
barriers in which fair and equal services are lost. Rural communities often have higher
concentrations of low-income earners, higher poverty rates, increased rates of mental
health issues, lower levels of education, and increased involvement in risky sexual
behavior resulting in higher rates of teen pregnancy & STIs (CIHI, 2006; Dryburgh,
2000; Nelson & Schmidek, 2008; Romanow, 2002; Pong, 2007; Fairbaim & Gustafson,
2008; Kirby & LeBreton, 2002a). While the entire community will feel the restriction of
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services by Catholic hospitals, those who are already vulnerable (e.g., women, the
minimally educated, those of low socioeconomic status, and teenagers) will be
particularly affected.
In the following paragraphs I will discuss potential barriers to accessing reproductive
services in the rural environment and how they relate to the diagram shown. Each barrier
is multi faceted and can present a wide array of challenges. For these reasons a detailed
discussion of each barrier is warranted. In addition, as figure 2 depicts, while each barrier
can exist independently, each is also influenced by the broader context (delineated here as
‘systemic influences’) and interrelated with one another.

Figure 2. Barriers to access
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3.3.5.1 Transportation
Access to public transportation is often limited in rural areas (Romanow, 2002; Kirby
& LeBreton, 2002a; Fairbaim & Gustafson, 2008). Schedules may be sporadic and long
walks and multiple transfers may be necessary. Roads can often be seasonally affected,
impacting the ability for individuals to travel from one community to another and the
speed in which their journey can be accomplished.

3.3.5.2 Cost
Rural areas are characterized by a higher demographic o f low-income earners
(Romanow, 2002; Kirby & LeBreton, 2002a; Fairbaim & Gustafson, 2008; Pong, 2007;
CIHI, 2006). While the restriction of services by Catholic hospitals.affects everyone,
low-income women and those who are poorly educated, are particularly vulnerable.
Many o f these people work at lower paying jobs that do not typically carry high security.
The luxury o f sick days is often not an option and it remains difficult to take time from
work to seek medical services elsewhere. If they do, they experience the double burden of
pay loss, while concurrently absorbing the financial hardships o f travel outside the region
which is often more costly in rural as opposed to urban areas (Fairbaim & Gustafson,
2008). Other costs might include: accommodations, meals, as well as child or elder care.
In addition, those with low incomes might not enjoy job benefits that would cover the
costs o f medically indicated pharmaceuticals (e.g., EC) and may be more reliant on their
local hospital for access to these options. Most hospitals will cover the costs of most
medically indicated pharmaceuticals when patients are under their care (CIHI, 2006).
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3.3.5.3 Time
The increased time required to access services outside one’s community may impose
delays on time sensitive interventions. For instance, EC must be administered within 72
hours or it becomes significantly less effective (WHO, 2004; ACOG Committee on
Practice Bulletins-Gynecology, 2010). Because a hospital’s catchment area may be large
geographically, in rural areas one’s local hospital can be thirty minutes away. If this
hospital is Catholic, and will not provide the service, the next available hospital might be
hours away, thus making the logistics more complicated.

3.3.5.4 Confidentiality

^

Safeguarding confidentiality in rural areas can be difficult and is identified in the
literature as an important ethical issue (Nelson, 2004; Nelson & Schmidek, 2008).
Boundary conflicts due to overlapping roles and close-knit ties within the community can
remove elements o f anonymity and compromise confidentiality (Nelson & Schmidek,
2008). In some cases leaving the region might also require informing or soliciting the
help o f others. For those who fear severe repercussions from family and friends,
expanding the circle o f trust can be traumatic.

:

3.3.5.5 Age
Youth have an increased dependence on others. In rural areas especially, they are
often further limited in their ability to access services, by costs, access to transportation,
time, and community values and stigmas. Youth are also generally highly visible in the
community and along with seniors, represent a disproportionate number o f rural
inhabitants (Kirby & LeBreton, 2002a). These factors help make their actions and
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- activities more noticeable. For example, failing to show up for school will be documented
and reported to parents or guardians. Furthermore, when seeking out abortion services,
teenagers are more likely to use hospitals (Dryburgh, 2000).

3.3.5.6 Health Literacy
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines health literacy as the “cognitive and
social skills which determine the motivation and ability of individuals to gain access to,
understand and use information in ways which promote and maintain good health”
(WHO, 1998, p.10). Health literacy is therefore more than being able to read a pamphlet.
It involves the capacity to access and use the information to make fully informed
decisions about one’s health (WHO, 1998, p.10; & Peerson & Saunders, 2009).
“Health literacy is itself dependent upon more general levels of literacy” (WHO,
1998, p.10). Those with lower levels of education, cognitive disabilities that affect
reading and comprehension, and those whose first language is not predominate within the
region, may face significant burdens navigating and understanding health options
(McKeary & Newbold, 2010; Newbold & Willinsky, 2009; WHO, 1998). In Canada,
education and other social variables are strongly associated with one’s knowledge and
use o f reproductive options (Black et. al., 2009; Rotermann & McKay, 2009). As cited by
Black et. al. (2009), “despite many contraceptive options, Canadian women [including
rural women] continue to use a narrow range o f contraceptive methods and to use
contraception inconsistently” (p.627). In addition, a 2005 study on knowledge about EC
in the U.S. revealed that only 67% of women respondents answered that they were aware
o f options to prevent pregnancy after sexual intercourse (Abbott, 2005). Moreover, of
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.those who knew about EC, nearly half were unclear about the correct time constraints (72
/

'

hrs). Many mistakenly believed it must be taken within 24 hours (Abbott, 2005). In
situations where access to EC is not immediate, this false belief could lead individuals to
put off attempting to travel elsewhere, believing it is too late.
: Access to detailed information about Catholic hospitals can be hard to find. Easily
accessible lists o f where each hospital is located and what reproductive services each
provides, do not exist. In many cases, patients are left to creatively investigate what their
options are and where to go. Patients may alternatively discover first hand what is not
provided. As previously stated, many women are not fully aware of what services
Catholic Hospitals do not provide (Belden, Russonello & Stewart, 2,000). Requesting
services where they are morally prohibited may subject patients to moral criticism,
potentially diminishing their autonomy as well as their emotional (and perhaps physical)
well-being.
In rural areas accessing information on a home computer may be difficult as a number
of homes are still reliant on dial-up internet or do not have access to broadband internet
connections (McKeown, Noce & Czerny, 2007; Fairbaim & Gustafson, 2008).
Navigating across multiple high resolution web pages may be time consuming and
frustrating. Alternatively, accessing information in public may also present challenges.
Depending on the location o f resources (e.g., placement o f computers and pamphlets)
within a building, going to a public library or pharmacy to access relevant information
can draw attention and reduce confidentiality (e.g., are computer screens easily visible to
other library patrons; are pamphlets located directly next to the pharmacist or cashier).
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3.3.5.7 Systemic Influences
No system operates in a vacuum. Each of the barriers described will be influenced by
the broader context. These factors include, but are not limited to the economic status of
the region, the number of health care providers and institutions per capita, cultural
diversity, the influence of religious ideologies, various social determinants of health, and
the present political climate - regionally, provincially, and nationally.

3.3.5.8 How Barriers Interrelate
The rural health care setting is a unique and challenging environment. As mentioned
at the outset, while each barrier can exist independently, they are frequently interrelated.
Together these individual barriers compound and contribute to each other, leading to a
sum much larger than its constituent parts. This sum contributes to what I term, a total
‘burden of access quotient’.
For example, a teenager living in a rural area faced with an unwanted pregnancy and
served by a Catholic hospital, might experience a significant compounding o f barriers in
her attempts to terminate the pregnancy. Because of her age and dependence on others,
our teenager, not wanting to inform others of her situation, will be forced to take public
transportation and incur costs she cannot afford. Her absence from school will be noticed
and relayed to parents, and the bus driver could easily be a family friend. Looking up
resources online may not be easy because the family computer is located in the living
room and teachers monitor school computers. Our teenager, expected to be home each
day between four and five o’clock also has time constraints. Traveling by public transit
may take too long and not present a viable option.
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When a population who does not have the means is automatically precluded from
equitable health care, it violates accessibility and justice standards. In rural areas there
may be a two-tiered system when Catholic hospitals limit the availability of reproductive
health care services, as these limitations can place potentially insurmountable burdens on
those most vulnerable. This practice promotes unjust distributions of health care burdens.
It also violates the public’s interest in comprehensive and unbiased health care. Needless
to say, in these circumstances, limits on the conscientious refusals of Catholic hospitals
are warranted.

3.4 Conclusion

■

In a pluralist society, where health care is administered as a public good, institutions
must practice a wide range o f tolerance in order to ensure the needs o f the population
they serve are adequately met. For Catholic hospitals, this requires limiting their ability to
conscientiously refuse to provide reproductive services to which they morally oppose, in
circumstances where the needs of the population will not otherwise be met, or where their
refusals would impose significant burdens on individuals, hospitals, or other HCPs in the
area.
There are a number o f good reasons to protect the conscientious refusals of Catholic
hospitals. The promotion o f religious diversity, the hospitals’ integrity, and respect for
their legacy and continued contributions to health care are each valid points. As much as
their contributions are admirable however, their participation in the public system should
not come at the cost o f reasonably accessible health care. Furthermore, while loosing
Catholic hospitals would represent a significant setback to the Canadian health care
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, system, if we are committed to the reproductive health and well being of individuals we
must accept this possibility and implement contingency plans to address it, as opposed to
simply allowing the threat o f withdrawal to override the reproductive autonomy and
interests o f those who ultimately guide and fund the health care system (individual
Canadians).
As established in the previous discussion, while the implications o f conscientious
refusals by Catholic hospitals may be tolerable in urban areas, in rural areas a strong case
for imposing limits on their refusals emerges. Given the previous discussion, in order to
safeguard the autonomy of individuals as well as promote principles of beneficence, non
maleficence, and justice, refusals by Catholic hospitals must be limited in situations
where:

‘

1) A Catholic hospital is an area’s sole service provider,
2) Reasonable and timely access to reproductive services is not available elsewhere
within the community or region,
3) Refusals would impose significant financial burdens on other hospitals in the area,
4) Refusals would impose significant burdens on an individual’s autonomy,
5) An individual HCP who is willing to work in a rural, remote, northern, or
underserviced area, would have their conscience overridden or negatively
impacted (when providing medically indicated care or care they feel is in the best
interests of the patient) by hospital religious policy, or
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6) Refusals would present significant barriers to accessing equitable health care
services or impose an unjust distribution of care on individuals or communities
with the least means to overcome such refusals.
In these situations the interests of the public to accessing equitable health care services
override the interests of the Catholic hospital to conscientiously object and concessions
on behalf o f the hospital must be made.
Although a detailed policy assessment is beyond the scope of this thesis, I encourage
policy makers to be creative in incorporating these limitations into policy solutions and to
keep in mind important systemic factors that might affect their decisions. In the
discussion I offer a number o f recommendations in order to providefnsight and to act as a
launching point for dialogue and debate.
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Chapter 4: Discussion
4.1 Summary of Findings
The purpose o f this thesis was to examine the ethical implications o f Catholic hospital
conscientious refusals to provide reproductive services that they morally oppose, within
the context o f the Canadian health care system and more specifically within rural areas.
To achieve this goal two main questions were identified:
1) Do hospitals possess a conscience according to the dominant view of conscience
in bioethics?

'

'

''

2) Should Catholic hospitals be permitted to refuse to provide reproductive services
to which they are morally opposed within the context of the Canadian health care
system and in particular, within rural areas?

Chapter two began with a brief introduction to the concept o f conscience. This was
followed by a description o f the dominant view, and a proposal o f the criteria necessary,
for an entity to qualify as possessing a conscience on this view. Using the developed
criteria as a framework for analysis, I discussed reasons why hospitals might satisfy the
requirements of conscience as well as reasons why they do not. Ultimately, I concluded
that the dominant view does not support the contention that hospitals possess a
conscience, as they fail to meet at least three of the five criteria necessary for it, namely
.
,
■ $
'
'
cognitive agency, affective agency, and internal sanctioning. For these reasons, upholding
the same respect for conscience and conscientious refusal for hospitals as we would for .
individuals is not warranted, as they do not properly possess a conscience.
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Because some could disagree with me whether hospitals possess a conscience —for

instance they may not accept the dominant view - in chapter three I focused my attention
on determining whether and to what degree Catholic hospitals ought to receive
conscience protections. In that chapter I argued that, in as much as their refusals do no
disadvantage or impose significant burdens on individuals, the community, or other
hospitals and health care professionals (HCPs) in the service area, Catholic hospitals
might legitimately receive some conscience protection. However, in cases where
significant burdens, limitations, or injustices are imposed, or where reasonable and timely
access to services is compromised, the protection of conscience is no longer ethically
justified. Although there were valid reasons for protecting the conscientious refusals o f ;
Catholic hospitals, my analysis o f both sides of the debate lead me to conclude that
limitations are warranted in cases where:
1) A Catholic hospital is an area’s sole service provider,
2) Reasonable and timely access to reproductive services is not available elsewhere
within the community or region,
3) Refusals would impose significant financial burdens on other hospitals in the area,
4) Refusals would impose significant burdens on an individual’s autonomy,
5) An individual HCP who is willing to work in a rural, remote, northern, or
underserviced area, would have their conscience overridden or negatively
impacted (when providing medically indicated care or care they feel is in the best
interests of the patient) by hospital religious policy, or
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6) Refusals would present significant barriers to accessing equitable health care
services or impose an unjust distribution o f care on individuals or communities
with the least means to overcome such refusals.
In these situations the interests o f the public to accessing equitable health care

services override the interests o f the Catholic hospital to conscientiously object and
concessions on behalf of the hospital must be made.

4.2 Policy Recommendations
Although a detailed policy analysis and set of recommendations are beyond the scope
of this thesis, there are a number of preliminary suggestions that may serve as a platform
for more detailed policy proposals. In moving forward, I encourage policy makers to
consider innovative policy solutions that respect the contributions of Catholic hospitals to
health care, while upholding the interests of Canadians to access equitable health care
services.

..•••

1) Unless Catholic hospitals agree to provide reasonable reproductive services,
governments may consider not allowing Catholic hospitals to operate in
environments where they would be an area’s sole provider, or where reasonable
and timely access to reproductive services is not available elsewhere within the
region.

.
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2) Where Catholic hospitals are operational, governments should ensure
comprehensive reproductive services are provided through other means with
reasonable hours o f operation and access.19
3) To help preserve autonomy, all Catholic hospitals should be required to fully
inform patients of relevant and medically indicated health care options, including
those to which they morally oppose. Staff should also be required to deliver this
information in an unbiased manner that focuses on the medical implications o f the
service, as opposed to their perceived moral implications.
4) In cases where patient distress is high, and going elsewhere for services would be
physically or emotionally unmanageable, Catholic hospitals should have an
obligation to provide the service or to facilitate transportation to a facility that
can.

'

’ '

'

'

'

5) Disclosure statements regarding what reproductive services each Catholic hospital
provides and does not provide, should be easily accessible and visible within the
hospital, as well as posted on their website. Staff should also disclose relevant
services to which the organization objects and provide the patient with
information on how to access these services if they so choose.

19 O f n ote, in som e circu m stan ces, relian ce on free standing clinics o r health u n its m ay not p ro v id e ad equate levels o f
access, as th e ir capacity to su p p ly serv ices (e.g., tubal ligations and vasecto m ies), o r th eir hours o f operation (e.g., I f a
w o m an is sex u ally assau lted on a F rid ay n ig h t w ill th e clinic b e o pen? W ill it be open on S aturday or S unday?) m ay be
lim ited. F u rth erm o re, in rural areas, giv en th e ethical issues su rro u n d in g co nfidentiality, a sp ecialized freestanding
clinic d ev o ted to p ro v id in g th ese services, m a y n o t be a p articu larly v iab le option.
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6) Where refusals by Catholic hospitals would impose significant financial burdens
on other hospitals in the area special funding may need to be allocated to these
hospitals in order to help compensate for the extra burden imposed.
Although these policy proposals are not exhaustive, they provide an important
starting point for future policy discussions and decisions.

4.3 Applications of Research
To assume that the cases o f Midland, Ontario, and St. Elizabeth’s in Humbolt,
Saskatchewan, were one time isolated incidents would be erroneous. The experiences of
Midland and Humbolt can be extrapolated to rural (and urban) areas across the Provinces,
the Nation, and beyond Canada’s borders.

-

In the United States, approximately 12.7% of hospitals are Catholic (Catholic Health
Association o f the United States, 2011). Catholic organizations also own 11 of the 40
largest health care systems in the country (Ascension Health, the third largest system in
the U.S. counts 78 hospitals in 20 States as part of its organizational structure) (United
States Conference o f Catholic Bishops, n.d.) and control seven o f the ten largest non
profit hospitals (Fogel & Rivera, 2004). In 1999, there were also 91 counties in the U.S.
where a Catholic institution was the sole hospital provider (Fogel & Rivera, 2004) and as
of 2011, a third o f Catholic hospitals are located in rural areas (Catholic Health
Association o f the United States, 2011). In many cases, refusals by Catholic hospitals

,

have removed access to a long list o f reproductive service options (Fogel & Rivera, 2004;
Sloboda, 2001). These decisions have effectively precluded entire segments of the ;
population from services to.which these hospitals oppose.
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Outside North America, the issue of conscientious refusals by HCPs and to some
extent hospitals, has sparked growing debate, especially in Latin America where the
Catholic Church exercises a great deal o f influence over public policy and health care
decisions (Casas, 2009; Cook & Dickens, 2009; Cook, Olaya & Dickens, 2009). The
topic is also relevant to developing countries, where the Roman Catholic Church funds a
number o f hospitals and health outreach programs, which in many cases are the only ones
in the area (Catholics for Choice, 2008). In Africa for example, this includes funding
programs targeted at preventing the transmission of HIV/AIDS (a major health crisis in
the region) but does not include dispensing condoms or educating individuals on the
merits o f their use (Catholics for Choice, 2008). According to a joint position statement
by UNAIDS, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the World Health
Organization (WHO) (2009) “the male latex condom is the single, most efficient,
available technology to reduce the sexual transmission o f HIV and other sexually
transmitted infections”(p.l).
While each country assumes its own framework of health care administration the fact
remains - the denial o f reproductive services by Catholic hospitals can easily limit access
as well as the autonomy o f those most in need. For these reasons despite the present
research having a Canadian focus, much o f the analysis also has relevant international
applications.
In presenting this analysis I trust that it will contribute to and help further the limited
body o f knowledge concerning conscientious refusals by Catholic hospitals in Canada, as
well as to provide targeted insight into its potential impact on rural communities within
the country. I also trust it will help to spark dialogue and debate regarding this important
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topic, as well as to inform and influence future health policy decisions within Canada and
abroad.

;

4.4 Future Research
The lack o f Canadian research on conscientious refusals by Catholic hospitals
provides for a broad spectrum of possibilities for future investigation. Having presented a
reasoned, normative analysis on the current situation and proposed limits that ought to be
imposed ethically, a beneficial future step would be to examine the issue empirically.
Canadian research is needed to explore how individuals within this country interpret
and experience the refusals o f Catholic hospitals as well as their familiarity with the
topic. Studies that assume quantitative methods as well as those that assume qualitative
methods would each help to address this need. Questions for future investigation may
include:
■ What do Canadians expect their hospital to provide by way of reproductive health
options? Do they believe that these same expectations should apply to Catholic
hospitals?

.

■ Are Canadians aware of what Catholic hospitals will and will not provide, and to
what extent?
■ How are conscientious refusals by Catholic hospitals experienced by patients as
well as HCPs in Canada?
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■ How is the experience o f Catholic hospital conscientious objection different
across health care professions, within rural as opposed to urban areas, and across
different segments o f the population?
Research is also needed to more precisely determine the scope of the issue as well as
to identify areas o f interest or ‘hot spots’ across the country. Specific approaches to
research might include:
■ Surveying Catholic hospitals across the country to determine exactly what
reproductive services each provides, as well as how often services are not
provided as a result of hospital refusal policy.
■ This same survey may also ask hospitals to provide insight into the justifications
behind their policies on different reproductive health services and interventions.
These justifications can be analyzed in order to identify similarities and
discrepancies between hospitals across Canada.
O f note, attempts at researching these two questions could be fraught with difficulty,
as Catholic hospitals may be reluctant to draw attention to what reproductive services
they have and have not chosen to provide, for fear o f sparking controversy or alienation
on both sides o f the debate. In order to increase participation, researchers may want to
consider removing identifiers from published research investigating the specific practices
o f each Catholic hospital.
Finally, as suggested earlier in this chapter, policy analyses and recommendations
should be drafted in order to provide guidance to governments on how they might handle
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conscientious refusals by Catholic hospitals as well as mergers between secular and
Catholic hospitals.

,

4.5 Conclusion
The world in which Catholic hospitals operate has changed. Rapid advancements in
technology have introduced health care options unthinkable twenty years ago. Some of
these options contradict Catholic moral teachings about the beginning and end o f life, as
well as those related to sexuality and reproduction. While Catholic hospitals continue to
make significant contributions to the Canadian health care system, their refusals to
provide reproductive services to which they are morally opposed can compromise an
individual’s ability to access medically indicated services, as well as their autonomy.
In my analysis o f the two guiding research questions I argued that: 1) hospitals could
not legitimately claim to possess a conscience according to the dominant view of
conscience in bioethics and therefore could not conscientiously object in a legitimate
manner; and 2) that the refusals of Catholic hospitals warrant limitations in a number of
important circumstances, many of which are applicable to rural areas. I trust that this
analysis will succeed in furthering the limited body o f knowledge concerning the
conscientious refusals o f Catholic hospitals in Canada, to spark dialogue and debate, and
finally, to inform and influence future health policy decisions.
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APPENDIX A. Inventory o f Catholic Health Care Facilities in Canada
H E A D IN G D E F IN IT IO N S & C O D E S

R ef. # : T h e referen ce n u m b e r assig n ed to each h ealth care facility

F a c ility (S ite) N a m e : N a m e o f th e health care facility site

C o r p o r a te O rg a n iz a tio n A ffilia tio n : N am e o f the health care organization to w hich the health care facility belongs
(w here ap p licab le)
S p o n s o r: N a m e o f th e C ath o lic sponsor

C ity /T o w n : N a m e o f the city o r tow n w here th e site is located
P ro v in c e : N a m e o f th e pro v in ce w h ere the site is located
B C = B ritish C olum bia
A B = A lb erta
S K = S askatchew an
M B = M an ito b a

^

O N - O ntario
Q C = Q uebec
N B = N e w B ru n sw ick

.

N S = N o v a S cotia
N F = N ew fo u n d lan d

:

F a c ility T y p e : D elin ea tes th e general type o f facility

,

v

H = A cu te C are (G eneral o r Special) H ospitals
L = L o n g T erm C are C entre
S = H ospice
R = R etirem en t H o m e/R eso u rce C entre
.

N = N u rsin g Station
O = O u tp atien t H ealth Services C entre
A = H om e C are
T = T reatm en t

^
■ ., ■

.

--

.

,

P = P ublic H ealth /M en tal H ealth U nits

F a c ility S u b -T y p e : D elin ea tes th e m o re specialized focus o f the facility
G en. = G eneral
R esid. C are Fac. = R esidential care facility
R ehab. = R ehabilitation

.
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•

H o sp ice = H ospice
E x t. C are = E x ten d ed care

,

N u r. H o m e = N u rsin g hom e
A ux. H osp. = A u x iliary h ospital
R etirem en t H o m e = R etirem en t h o m e

.

.

.

Spec. C are H om e = S pecial care h o m e
P sych. = P sychiatric
P ers. C are H om e = P erso n al C are H om e
H o m e fo r A g ed = h o m e fo r th e aged
H o m e C are = H o m e care
C hron. “ C hro n ic
O u tp atien t C entre = O u tp atien t centre
C o m m u n ity H ealth = C o m m u n ity health
T reatm en t C en tre = T reatm en t centre

S ta tu s : D en o tes w h eth er the health c are facility is ‘p u b lic’ o r ‘p riv a te ’.
1 = P ublic
“ A p ublic hospital is defined as one w h ic h is not operated for profit, accepts all patien ts regardless o f
th e ir ab ility to pay, an d is reco g n ized as a public hospital b y the p rovince in w hich it is lo cated ”
(C anadian H ealth care A sso ciatio n , 201 1 , p.6).

2 = P rivate
“ A p riv ate hospital is defin ed as o n e w h ic h o rd in arily restricts its adm issions to p atien ts p ay in g for th e
care pro v id ed , at rates d eterm ined b y th e m anagem ent” (C anadian H ealthcare A ssociation, 20 11, p.6).
“A p riv ate long-term -care facility is defin ed as o n e w hich ordinarily restricts its adm issions to clients
(resid en ts) p ay in g for the care p ro v id ed at rates d eterm ined by the m anagem ent. H ow ever, th ere are
p riv ately operated special care facilities w hich do n o t restrict adm issions. T hese m ay be facilities funded
b y a p ro v in v ial g overnm ent, o r p riv ate individuals w h o h ave form ed a not-fo r-p ro fit co rporation and
co n tract w ith gov ern m en t an d asso ciatio n s to pro v id e care” (C anadian H ealthcare A ssociation, 2011,
p.6).

Y e a r E s ta b lis h e d : Y e a r th e health care facility w as established

B ed s: T otal n u m b er o f beds lo cated at the site - n o t in cluding certain specialized beds such as those in operating
theatres, observ atio n and h o ld in g beds, beds lo cated in em ergency, day surgery beds, recovery beds, and b irth ing beds.

T o ta l A d m is sio n s : “A n in p atien t adm ission is defin ed as the no rm al acceptance and reception o f a p erso n as an
inpatient. S uch reception involves the allo catio n o f a reg u lar facility bed, cot o r b assin et” (C anadian H ealthcare
A ssociatio n , 20 1 1 , p.14).

S ta ff: T o tal n u m b e r o f full tim e equivalent sta ff w o rk in g at facility site o r em ployed b y the organization

113
B u d g e t: “ T he ap p ro x im ate annual co st o f ru nning th e h ealthcare facility, b ased on the latest figures available as
p ro v id ed b y th e facility o r regional b o a rd ” (C anadian H ealthcare A sso ciatio n , 2011, p. 14).

A d d re s s : m ailin g ad d ress fo r th e h ealth care facility site

:

R e g io n a l/L o c a l H e a lth A u th o rity A ffilia tio n : T he regional o r local health authority to w hich the health care facility
site b elong s (w here ap p licab le o r listed).

W e b site : H ealth care facility o r o rganizational w eb site

A d d itio n a l C o m m e n ts : A dd itio n al in fo rm atio n en tered to give insight into the w o rk o f the facility o r o th er relevant
inform atio n ab o u t it - in fo rm atio n en tered at the discretion o f the researcher.
In f o rm a tio n S o u rc e (s): S ource o f info rm atio n contributing to the info rm atio n entered about th e facility

G C H F - G uide to H e alth c are F acilities in C anada (C anadian H ealth c are A ssociation, 2011)
C H A C D = C atholic H ealth A llian ce o f C an ad a [C H A C ] D irecto ry (available online at:
w w w .ch ac.ca/allian ce/d irecto rv /m em b ersh ip -d irecto rv e.p h p ) (C H A C , n.d.a)
C H A O = C atholic H ealth A sso ciatio n o f O ntario [C H A O ] - m em bers list (available o nline at:
w w w .ch ao n t.ca/ab o u tu s/m em b ers.p h p ) (C H A O , n .d)
C H C O = C ath o lic H ealth C orp o ratio n o f O ntario [C H C O ] - m em b er institutions list (available online at:
w w w .ch co .ca/ab o u t/m em b erin stitu tio n s.p h p ) (C H C O , n .d.)
O W = O rganizational W eb site (specified w h ere applicable in table)

R e f.#
040
041
043
044
Ö45
046
047
048
049
050
051
052
053
054
055
056
058
059
060
061
062
063
064
066
067
068
069
070
071
072
074
075
076
077
078
079

Facility (Site) N am e
Saint Boniface General Hospital
Winnipegosis General Hospital Inc.
M isericordia Health Centre (1)
Saint Paul’s Home
Villa Youville Inc.
Doctor Gendreau Personal Care Home Inc.
Foyer Valade Inc.
Holy Family H ome Inc.
Saint Amant Inc.
Trache Centre
.
Saint Joseph's Residence Inc.
W innipegosis-Mossey R iver Personal Care Home Inc.
M isericordia Health Centre (2)
Sara Riel Inc.
Hôpital de L'Enfant-Jesus RHSJ
Hôpital Stella-Maris-de-Kent
Foyer Notre-Dame-de-Lourdes Inc.
Mount Saint Joseph Nursing Home
Foyer St. Joseph de St-Basile Inc
Rocmaura Inc.
.
Saint Patrick’s M ercy Home
■
Saint Martha's Regional Hospital
Saint Vincent’s Nursing Home
.
Villa St. Joseph-du-Lac
Saint Joeseph's Home Care
Saint-Vincent Hospital
.
St. Mary’s o f the Lake Hospital
Providence Hospital
Saint Joseph's Hospital
Saint Joseph's Health Centre Guelph (1)
Parkwood Hospital
Hotel Dieu Hospital o f Kingston
Saint Mary’s General Hospital ,
M attawa General Hospital
Pembroke Regional Hospital
Saint Joseph’s Health Centre - Toronto
Chatham-Kent Health Alliance
Hotel Dieu Site
Saint Joseph’s Healthcare - Charlton Campus
Saint Michael’s Hospital

i

C o rp o ra te O rganization Affiliation

■■
. ■
. ■.
.
■
■
;Misericordia Health Centre
r
11- '
I-

,

■

.
■ .

.

'

■

:.

Ì-

.

-

.

)■

.

i- .
■
M isericordia Health Centre
iÍ. .
■
j.
■
.
- ■
'
■u
ij-

'
iSaint Joseph's Healthcare Hamilton
[Bruyere Continuing Care ;
¡Providence Care
¡Providence Healthcare Toronto
ISaint Joseph's Care Group
ISaint Joseph's Health Centre - Guelph
jSt. Joseph's Health Care London
1>

■

1 -

-

1*

■

■

.

-

.

*

.

.

■
■

.

.

'

G hatham -K ent Health Alliance
¡Hotel-Dieu Grace Hospital
iSaint Joseph’s Healthcare Hamilton
ISaint M ichael’s Hospital

-

;

Sponsor

G atholic Health Corporation o f Manitoba
¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Manitoba
M isericordia Corporation - Archdiocese o f W innipeg
¡Sisters Servants o f M ary Immaculate
!- - :
' .
'
'
•
G atholic H ealth Corporation o f Manitoba
¡Sisters Servants o f M ary Immaculate
•
ICatholic Health Corporation o f Manitoba
¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Manitoba
G atholic Health Corporation o f Manitoba
G atholic H ealth Corporation o f Manitoba
¡Misericordia Corporation - Archdiocese o f W innipeg
Catholic H ealth Corporation o f Manitoba
¡Catholic Health International (Catholic Health Partners)
G atholic Health International (Catholic Health Partners)
¡Catholic Healtli International (Catholic Health Partners)
¡Catholic Health International (Catholic Health Partners)
¡Catholic Health International (Catholic Health Partners)
G atholic Health International (Catholic Health Partners)
¡Sisters o f Mercy
¡Sisters o f St. Martha
¡Roman Catholic Archdiocese o f Halifax
'
G atholic Health International (Catholic Health Partners)
iSt. Joseph's Health System
¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
G atholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
.
¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
¡St. Joseph’s health System Hamilton
ISt. Joseph's Health Care Society London
/ ¡Religious Hospitallers o f St. Joseph
^ iSt. Joseph's Health S ystem .
G atholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
¡St. Joseph's H ealth Care Society London
¡Catholic Health International (Catholic Health Partners)
;St. Joseph’s Health System
iCatholic H ealth Corporation o f Ontario

R ef. #

F acility (Site) N am e

ì

C o rp o ra te O rg an izatio n Affiliation

:

Sponsor

080

Saint Joseph's General Hospital - Elliot Lake
Saint Joseph's Hospital

;St. Joseph’s General Hospital - Elliot Lake
•St. Joseph's Health Care London

C atholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
¡St. Joseph's Health Care Society London

082
083
084
085
086
087
088
089
090

The Southdown Institute
Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care
.
Mental Health Services
Lakehead Psychiatric Hospital
Saint Joeseph’s Healthcare - West 5th Campus
Regional Mental Health Care - London
Regional M ental Health Care - St. Thomas
Hotel Dieu Shaver Health & Rehabilitation Centre
Elisabeth Bruyere Hospital
:
Saint Joseph's Villa - Dundas
St. Patrick's Home Ottawa
*
Marianhill Home For the Aged
St. Joseph's at Fleming
Elisabeth Bruyere Residence
Saint-Louis Residence
Providence Manor
Saint Josephs Health Centre Guelph (2)
Saint Joseph's Continuing Care Centre Cornwall
Carmel Heights Seniors' Residence
Mariann Home
Saint Joseph’s Continuing Care Centre - Sudbury
Good Shepherd Centre
Cardinal Ambrozic Houses o f Providence
Hogarth Riverview Manor
St. Joseph's Heritage
Saint Joseph’s Lifecare Centre
Saint Joseph's M anor
M ount Hope Centre for Long-Term Care
Diabetes Health Thunder Bay
Saint Joesph's Healthcare - King Campus
Behavioural Sciences Centre
.
St. Joseph's H ealth Centre
Saint Joseph's Hospice Sarnia Lambton
Good Shepher Centres - Emmanuel House
Stedman Community Hospice
Balmoral Centre
Sister M argaret Smith Centre

i_

¡Emmanuel Convalescent Foundation
¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
C atholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
¡St. Joseph's Health System
.
|St. Joseph's Health Care Society London
¡St. Joseph's Health Care Society London
¡Catholic Health International (Catholic Health Partners)
C atholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
¡St. Joseph’s Health System
¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
'
iFontbonne Society Perterborough
C atholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
C atholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
;St. Joseph’s health System Hamilton
¡Religious Hospitallers o f St. Joseph
¡Carmelite Sisters o f Mississauga
¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
¡Good Shepherd Society
¡Catholic Health Corporation of Ontario
¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
¡St. Joseph's Health System
C atholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
¡St. Joseph's Health Care Society London
C atholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
iSt. Joseph's Health System
¡Catholic H ealth Corporation o f Ontario
¡Catholic Health Corporation of Ontario
¡St. Joseph's Health Care Society London
¡Good Shepherd Society
jSt. Joseph's Health System
¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario

092
093
094

097
099
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

r
¡Providence Care
.
¡Saint Joseph's Care Group
¡Saint Joseph's Healthcare Hamilton
¡St. Joseph’s Health Care London
;St. Joseph's Health Care London
i■.¡Bruyere Continuing Care
i. ¡-

-

.

¡Bruyere Continuing Care
¡Bruyere Continuing Care
¡Providence Care
¡Saint Joseph's Health Centre - Guelph
ij'
r
¡Good Shepherd Centres
.
¡Providence Healthcare Toronto
¡Saint Joseph's Care Group
¡Saint Joseph's Care Group
¡Saint Joseph's Lifecare Centre
¡St. Joseph's General Hospital - Elliot Lake
¡St. Joseph's Health Care London
¡Saint Joseph's Care Group
f
¡Saint Joseph's Healthcare Hamilton
¡Saint Joseph’s Care Group
¡Saint Joseph's Care Group
■
■
■
¡Good Shepherd Centres
¡Saint Joseph's Lifecare Centre
¡Saint Joseph's Care Group
'¡Saint Joseph's Care Group

1

'

.

.
"■

.
.

R e f.#
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

Facility (Site) N am e
Saint M ichael's Hospital Detoxification Centre
Oaks Centre Alcohol and Drug Treatment Centre
Hopital Marie-Clarac
Foyer de St-Celestin
Providence Notrc-Damc dc Lourdes Inc.
Saint Anthony's Hospital
• '
Saint Joseph's Hospital Estevan
Saint Joseph's Hospital - Gravelbourg
Saint Peter's Hospital - M elville
Saint Paul’s Hospital (Grey Nuns) o f Saskatoon
Providence Place for Holistic Health Inc.
Foyer St. Joseph Nursing Home Inc.
Mont St. Joseph Home Inc.
Saint Joeph's Health Centre - Maklin
Santa Maria Senior Citizens' Home Inc.
Foyer d'Youville - Gravelbourg
..................
Saint
Ann's Senior C itizens'V illage Corp
Saint Joseph's Home

!

i

C o rp o rate O rg an izatio n A ffiliation

iSaint Michael's Hospital
¡St. Joseph's General Hospital - Elliot Lake
>
'
’
'
‘
¡Catholic Health Ministry o f Saskatchewan
¡Catholic Health M inistry o f Saskatchewan
¡Catholic Health M inistry o f Saskatchewan
jCatholic Health M inistry o f Saskatchewan
. ¡Catholic Health M inistry o f Saskatchewan
¡Catholic Health M inistry o f Saskatchewan
¡Catholic Health M inistry o f Saskatchewan
ii.
'
•
'
¡Catholic Health M inistry o f Saskatchewan
¡Catholic Health Ministry o f Saskatchewan
¡Saint Joseph's Home

Sponsor

¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
¡Catholic Health Corporation o f Ontario
¡Sœurs de Charité de Sainte-Marie
¡Soeurs Grises de M ontreal
'
¡Sisters o f Providence
¡Saskatchewan Catholic Health Corporation
¡Saskatchewan Catholic H ealth Corporation
¡Saskatchewan Catholic Health Corporation
¡Saskatchewan Catholic Health Coiporation
¡Saskatchewan Catholic Health Corporation
¡Saskatchewan Catholic Health Corporation
¡Saskatchewan Catholic Health Corporation
¡Mont St. Joseph Foundation
.
Sisters o f St. Elizabeth, H umbolt
¡(Archepiscopal Corporation o f Regina)
¡Saskatchewan Catholic H ealth Coiporation
¡Saskatchewan Catholic Health Corporation
¡Ukrainian Sisters o f St. Joseph o f Saskatoon

............. -................... — ;-----

i

?

i
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R ef.#

City /Town

! Province • Facility Type i Facility Sub-Type

! Status I Year Established

;

11

¡21

Beds

i

Total Admissions i

S taff

B udget

i

001
Castor
Vegreville
Bonnyville
005
Camrose
006
Edmonton
007
Edmonton
008
Killam
009 ; Edmonton
010
Bonnyville
O il
Castor
012
Edmonton
013
Killam
014
Lethbridge
015
Lethbridge
Mundare
017
Saint Albert
018 - Trochu
019
Edmonton
020
Calgary
003

022
023
024
025
026
027
028.
029
030
031
033
034
035
036
037
038
039

Saint Albert
Lethbridge
Vancouver
Vancouver
Comox
Vancouver
Vancouver
Vancouver
Victoria
.
Vancouver
Vancouver
Vancouver
Vancouver
Vancouver Victoria
Comox
Vancouver
Sainte Rose-du-Lac

:Gen
Ja

b

ab

LAB
AB
AB
AB
AB
AB
AB
AB
AB
AB
AB
AB
AB
. AB
AB
AB
;BC
¡BC
BC
¡BC
iBC
;b

c

:h
:H
¡H
. .
:H
L
¡L
“IE"“ '.... .......... ...
!L
’
!L
;L
;L

Gen.
¡Gen.
Gen.
Gen.
iGen.
¡Aux. Hosp.
1Nur. Home
¡Nur. Home
¡Nur. Home
¡Nur. Home
¡Nur. Home
¡Nur. Home
:Nur. Home

;L
L
L

;L
■ :R
;R
]H
:H
H
|H

L
T

BC
¡BC
IBC
BC
ÎBC

L
L
L
:L
L
:L
iL
!L

IMB

;H

BC
¡BC

11911

i.

¡70

•

;h

¡Nur. Home ,
¡Nur. Home
¡Nur. Home
¡Retirement Home
Retirement Home
Gen.
¡Gen.
;Gen.
| Rehab.
iResid. Care Fac.
¡Resid. Care Fac.
iResid. Care Fac.
¡Resid. Care Fac.
iResid. Care Fac.
iResid. Care Fac.
Resid. Care Fac.
¡Resid. Care Fac.
¡Resid. Care Fac.
iResid. Care Fac.
¡Hospice
¡Gen

.

.
il
11986
¡33
176
'1 2 7 5 7 .........................
T ...........; ¡1924
ll
11988
¡343
¡57615
|l
U 969
¡298
"715060.......................
Il
' 11930
¡12.......... L
\ \ " r ': ....... 11927..........1............... 1202........
¡255..........................
i.
|1
11986
¡30
' i f .... ..... . L
"121... ........ L
iil
11895
1502
|l
il 963
j¡45
|1
¡1929
¡202
1302
¡1
!. ¡200
1130
¡15
12
¡191
11965
¡84
!■¡1
■
.
¡2011
¡150
il
il
11910
¡46
.....
h i2
- '
'
|2 ".
' u' . ■
141
‘1 3 3 ......... .......... - .....
11
¡118
1- ' * '
1■
il
11946
1140
‘i-'
il
11894
=757
¡23074
jl
11913
¡237
¡5782.
¡1947
¡76
il
■h ' ■ ‘
11990
¡76
11
¡23
. ..........................
j 1973
i
¡87
¡30
n
.
ji
Il 9 4 1 ................. " ........... T ¡200
¡70 .
.
¡i
" } i 947 ...............: ............ 1
i'
¡142 '
il 946
|I00
il '*
1.
' r
il '
‘ 1Î150
¡il
. 11991...................
|2 2 l1
'
n .............. 1969 ..................... . |84
' j- • '
1j- '
Il4
il
i11
¡1913
¡125
=¡2005
¡12
;1
126
¡1939
¡1222

■

¡289
¡236.2
¡1213
¡1234
L ■

' ¡23,597,787...........
¡140,000,000
... ¡138,000,000........
.

¡216............. ....¡16,000,000'..............................
i_ '
¡1058

¡37,000,000

¡300
!-

h
¡9,500,000
j¡2,700,000

.

•
.■

i- . .
r

-

1170
¡75
¡45
1-

■

. . . . . . .
.......
.•
:
"

:

....¡2,400,000................... '.... ■.......
' ” ......... ............ ........... .
i¡470,870,000
¡52,000,000

i-

¡3634
¡553.5
j.

¡53 ¡68
¡182

¡4,700,000

■

......1.....................................

j-

¡16,600 0ÖÖ..........." ...... .......
1-

~

~

'
’

¡_
I-

:.......

•

i.

.

.

i-

¡68

'

'

1i¡3,200,000

'

R e f#

051
052
053
054
055
056
057
058
059
060
061
062
063
064
065
066
067
068
069
070
071
072

i Province • Facility Type : Facility Sub-Type
¡Gen.
¡MB
H
:Gen.
Gen.
:Pers. Care Home
Pers. Care Home
Sainte Rose-du-Lac
;Pers. Care Home
:Pers. Care Home
Winnipeg
IMB
‘
;L
IPers. Care Home
Winnipeg
¡MB
L
:Pers. Care Home
M3
Winnipeg
:L
jPers. Care Home
Winnipegosis
;m b
|L
IPers. Care Home
Winnipeg
¡MB
|L
iPers. Care Home
Winnipeg
MB
¡Other
.
Caraquet
NB
:H
IGen.
Sainte Anne de Kent ¡NB
;H
¡Gen.
Bathurst
INB . ¡l
iNur. Home
Miramichi
|NB
iL
¡Nun Home
Saint Basile
INB
:L
INur. Home
Saint John
NB
Nur. Home
;L
Saint John’s
L
INFINur. Home
Antigonish
INSH
¡Gen.
Halifax
INS ■
:L
¡Home for Aged
Yarmouth
-NS ■
:L
¡Home for Aged
Hamilton
ION
:A
IHome Care
Ottawa
ON
iH
IChron.
Kingston
;ON
H
Chron.
Toronto
¡ON
Chron.
IH
Thunder Bay
¡ON
¡h
Chron.
Guelph
•ON
;H
IChron.
London
ON
:H
¡Chron.
Kingston
Io n
IGen.
iH
ON
Kitchener
¡H
¡Gen.

074
075
076
077
078
079

Pembroke
Toronto
Chatham
Windsor
Hamilton
Toronto

040
042
044

047
048
049

City/Town

Winnipeg
Winnipegosis
Winnipeg
Dauphin

Io n
:ON
:ON
¡ON
¡ON
ON

H
¡H
H
h

H
H

Gen.
Gen.
Gen.
Gen.
Gen.
Gen.

i Status 1 Y ear Established

;

1
¡1
¡1
¡1

11871
11966
¡1898
11928

¡485 ■
¡14
¡14
¡70

;1
:1
1
¡1

¡1975
j 1976
¡1957
¡1959

¡65 ¡154
¡276
¡211

¡1
!1
T
1
1
1
¡1
:2
l
l
¡1
¡1
¡2
12
;1
¡1
1
¡1
1

¡1973
¡1981
11898...........................
11974
11963
¡1966

¡100
¡20
¡288
j¡12
¡20

¡1949
11976
¡1972
¡1958
i 1906
¡1966
¡I960
11921
11924
¡1946
¡1857
¡1884
¡1861
¡1925
¡1845
¡¡924

il
1
¡1
il.
il
;1

11
;1

.

,

Total Adm issions ;

Beds

¡133
¡126
1150
¡209
¡82
¡149
¡74
1- '
¡336
¡144
¡347
¡224
¡91
1530
j 42
/ ¡191

23250
477

■ 1¡70

17
18
19
34
80
9

60
¡147.8
¡265
¡1100

35
6

63
321
30
130
38
40
117
•

792
1800
¡1526.....
-

.

¡6000

¡1890

¡283
¡305
1459
¡572

19905
¡11644
!¡575000

.

.

.

i 178

¡1890
¡1892

¡176
¡120
¡105
¡120
¡127
¡180
¡197.7
11232
¡93.3
>
'
507
11700
¡1700 ■
GOO

65
36

;«
979

'

;

B udget

¡250,000,000
¡1,553,225
i.
14,325,000
¡5,800,000
¡3,765,135
■
1175,000,000
¡60,000,000

¡93.1
715.2................ 1*
'
¡60,000,000
-

.

¡1878

'

S taff

¡4000

■

'
"

¡12,800,000
¡6,800,000
16,620,509
17,000,000
¡6,711,769
.
¡14,288,173
¡¡10,806,067
¡5,216,180
ii!- : ■ . ■
¡71,700,000
¡125,123,000
¡28,000,000

•
'

•
"!643

¡768
¡2470
1930
¡1785
¡2304.9
¡3999

¡69,000,000

¡6,873,036
¡231,524,000
¡127,000,000
¡170,000,000
[_
■

.

119

R ef.#

City/Town

; Province ! Facility Type

Facility Sub-Type

S tatus

Year Established

Beds

Total Adm issions i

S ta li

:

B udget

080

082
083
084
085
086
087
088
089

Aurora
Penetanguishene
Kingston
Thunder Bay

¡ON
¡ON
ON
¡ON

ill
¡H
H
:H

London

ON

H

Ottawa
Dundas

JO N
;ON

H
;L

093
094
095
096

Ottawa
Peterborough
Ottawa

¡ON
¡ON
¡ON

:L
:L
L

099
100

Cornwall
Mississauga
Richmond Hill

¡ON
ON
ON

:L

105
106
107

Thunder Bay
Thunder Bay

109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

London
Thunder Bay
Hamilton
Thunder Bay
Thunder Bay
Sarnia
Hamilton
Brantford
Thunder Bay
Thunder Bay

091

Psyc.
Psyc.
Psyc.
Psyc.
Psyc.
Psyc.

2
1
1
1

1966
1904
1854
1944

48
312
198
46

1079
266
98

i860 :
¡499

¡70,000,000
46,854,400

1

1870

454

73562

705

I-

Rehab.

1
1

1845

120

-

-

123,000,000

1
1
1

1954
1959
-

139
159
71

-

190
118
•«

-

1
1

235

-

1969

iL

Home for Aged
Nur. Home
Nur. Home
Nur. Home

¡ON
¡ON

L
:L

Nur. Home
Nur. Home

1
1

2004
1979

96
110

96
-

¡ON
¡ON
ON
:ON
ON
ON
¡ON
ON
¡ON
ON

I.
O
O
O
P
S
S
S
T
jT

Nur. Home
Outpatient centre
Outpatient centre
Psyc.
Community Health
Hospice
Hospice
Hospice
Treatment Centre
Treatment Centre

1
1
i

1869
-

L

Home
Home
Home
Home

for Aged
for Aged
for Aged
for Aged

390
; i' ’ ' -.............. .......'... ..../. -

;

285
-

;

■

s-

’

.

!-

.

'

:
L

•

1
1
1
1
1

.
- ■
2005
-

•_

10
10
6
22
-

36
117
40

¡3
15.2
i-

,

: {.
4,400,000
5.203,660

94
197

ii-

.

-

.

R ef.#
119
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

133
134
135
136

City/Town
Toronto
Elliot Lake
Montreal-Nord
Saint Celestin
Montreal
Esterhazy
Estevan
Gravelbourg
Melville
Saskatoon
Moose Jaw
Ponteix
Prince Albert
Macklin
Regina
Gravelbourg
Saskatoon
Saskatoon

! Province j Facility Type I Facility Sub-Type

.

¡ON

nr

QC
QC
QC
SK
¡SK
SK.
:SK ■
¡SK
SK ;
;s k

H
:L
L
|H
H
¡H
:H
:h
|L
iL

¡Treatment Centre
■Treatment Centre
¡Rehab.
¡Resid. Care Fac.
Resid. Care Fac.
¡Gen.
iGen.
:Gen.
¡Gen.
;Gen.
¡Pers. Care Home
¡Pers. Care Home

iSK
;SK
:SK
ISK

;L
IL
L
L

¡Pers. Care Home
¡Spec. Care Home
¡Spec. Care Home
¡Spec. Care Home
¡Spec. Care Home

i S tatus
4
4
\2

4
■2

4
1
¡1
H
¡1

i

Y ear E stablished

1»
¡1995
■1916
i1934
¡1940
4938
4928

i

Beds

¡22
52
498
¡52
¡162
¡22
¡91
¡9
¡200
¡174

¡2

4907
..... . 4995
4959

12
4
il
4
u

4996
4968
4961
¡1953
i 1965

¡26
447
¡50
¡79
¡85

.2

m

; Total Admissions

4856
¡¡71
¡671
¡2460
¡591

.

S taff
12.7
- ■
¡303
41
¡156.8
58
491
70

1

B udget
.

'

¡26,400,000
•'
41,000,000
¡2,893,311
46,000,000
:3,200,000
¡6,082,410

■>
' i17

'

.

.

j¡¡-

.

1 9 6 .............
30
29
460
i¡74
¡60

¡11,126,064................................
4,800,000
iS 1,253,050
” 4 0,000,b o o ..........
i¡$3,625,000

..........

027
028
029
030
031

034
035
036
037
038
039

A ddress
505 Lynx St. P.O. Box 1050 T IL 1H7
5402 - 47 st. P.O. Box 329 TOC 0X0
5241 - 43 st. P.O. Box 490, T9C 1R5
5001 Lakeshore Dr. P.O. Box 1008 T9N 2J7
4 0 6 - 53rd st.T 4 V 1Y5
.
1100 Youville Dr. W. T6L 5X8
16940-8 7 th ave. T 5R 4H 5
.
1 5203 - 49 ave P.O. Box 40. T0B 2L0
10707 - 29th ave N .W. T6J 6W 1
.
5001 Lakeshore Dr. P.O. Box 1008 T9N 2J7
5402 - 47 st. P.O. Box 329 TOC 0X0
11111 Jasper Ave. T 5K 0L 4
5203 - 49 ave P.O. Box 40. T0B 2L0
1400 -9 th ave S .T U 4 V 5
253 Southgate Blvs. T1K 2S1
Polomark Dr. P.O. Box T0B 3HÛ
9 St. Vital Ave. T8N lk l
451 de Chauney ave. P.O. Box 100, TOM 2C0
1 6 5 1 5 -8 8 ave. NW. TSR 0A4
332 - 146 Ave. S.E. T2N 2A3
451 de Chauney ave. P.O. Box 100, TOM 2C0
1 st. Vital ave. T8N lk l
.
950 14 st. S. T U 2Y8
3080 Prince Edward St. V5T 3N4
1081 Burrard St. V 6Z 1Y6
2137 Comox Ave. V9M1P2
7801 Argyle St. V5p 3L6
■
704 W. 69th Ave. V6P 2W3
3150 Rosemont Dr. V5S 2C9
861 Fairfield Rd. V 8V 5A 9
7801 Argyle St. V 5p3L 6
3080 Prince Edward St. V5T 3N4
4650 Oak St. V6H 4J4
255 W. 62nd Ave. V 5X 4V 4
4950 Heather St. V 5Z 3L 9
2474 Arbutus Road V8N 1V8
2137 Comox Ave. V 9M 1P2
’ 900 West 12th Ave. 9th Fl. V 5Z 1N3
P.O. Box 60, R0L ISO

;

Regional/Local H ealth A uthority A ffiliation

¡Alberta Health Services
¡Alberta Health Services
¡Alberta Health Services
¡Alberta H ealth Services
¡Alberta Health Services
¡Alberta Health Services
¡Alberta Health Services
¡Alberta Health Services
¡Alberta H ealth Services
¡Alberta Health Services
¡Alberta Health Services
¡Alberta Health Services
¡Alberta Health Services
¡Alberta Health Services
lAIberta Health Services
¡Alberta Health Services
i- .
'
¡Alberta Health Services
¡Alberta Health Services

W ebsite
www.catholichealth.ca
www.covenanthealth.ca
www.covenanthealth.ca
www.covenanllieaith.ca
www.stmarvscamrose.com
www.covenanthca.lth.ca
www.covenanthealth.ca
www.covenanlhealth.ca
www.covenantheaUh.ca
www.covenanthealth.ca

.

.

r ■
■
'
1- , ■•
■'
,
¡Alberta Health Services
¡Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Vancouver
¡Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Vancouver
¡Vancouver Island Health Authority, Victoria
¡Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Vancouver
i'
¡Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Vancouver
¡Vancouver Island Health Author! ly, Victoria
¡Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Vancouver
•Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Vancouver j
¡Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Vancouver /
¡Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Vancouver
¡Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Vancouver
¡Vancouver Island Health Authority, Victoria
¡Vancouver Island Health Authority, Victoria
¡Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, Vancouver
¡Parkland Regional Health Authority, Dauphin

•
.
-

'

.
.

www.covenanthealth.ca
www.covenanlhealth.ca
www.covenanthcalth.ca
www.covenantheaIth.ca
www.covenanthealth.ca
www.covenanthealth.ca
www.covcnantheaIth.ca
www.covenantheaith.ca
www.ilnh.net
wwvv.covenanthcalth.ca
www.fbvcrlacombe.ca .
www.covenanlhealth.ca
www.providencehealthcare.org
www.providencehealthcare.org
www.st ghcomox.ca
www.provi dene eliealthcare.org
www.columbusresidence.ca
-

■

www.rntstmarv.victoria.bc.ca
www.providencehealthcare.org
www.providencchealthcare.org
www.providencchealthcare.org
mvw.providencehealthcare.org
www.nrovidencehealthcare.org
vvww. sisters ofsaint a n n e .org/bc/m inistry. h im
www.sjghcoinox.ca
,
www.providencehealthcare.org
-

,

ZZI

R ef.#
001
002
003
004
005
006
007
008
009
010
Oli
012
013
014
015
016
017
018
019
020
021
022
023
024
025

R e f.#
040
041
042
043
044
045
046
047
049
050
051
052
053
054
055

A ddress
409 Trache ave. R2H 2A6
230 Bridge St. P.O. Box 280, ROL 2G0
99 Cornish Ave. R3C 1A2
703 Jackson St. R7N 2N2
15 Charrìere Rd. R5H 1C9
P.O. Box 420, ROL ISO
450, eh. River, R2M 5M4
165 Aberdeen ave. R2W 1T9

185 Despins St. R2H 2B3
1149 Leila Ave. R2P 1S6
230 Bridge St. P.O. Box 280, ROL 2G0
99 Cornish Ave. R3C 1A2
210 Kenny Street, R2H 2E4
1 boul. St-Pierre Ouest, E1W 1B6
7714 Rte. 134, E4S 1H5
2055 prom. Vallee-lourdes, E2A 4P8
057
51 Lobban Ave. E IN 2W8
058
475 rue Pincipale E7C 1J2
059
10 Parks /st, E2K 4P1
146 Elizabeth Ave. A lB 1S5
060
061
25 Bay St. B2G 2G5
062
2080 Windsor St. B3K 5B2
063 - R.R.T, P.O. Box 810, B5A4A5
064
698 King St. W .,L 8P 1C7
:.
065
60 Cambridge St. L1R 7A5
340 Union St. W .K 7L 5A 2
066
067
3276 S t ClairAve. E. M IL 1WI
068
35 Algoma St. N. P.O. Box 3251 P7B 5G7
069
100 Westmount Rd. N1H 5H8
070
801 Commissioners Rd. E. N6C 5J1
071
166 Brock St. K7L 5G2
072
911 Queen’s Blvd. N2M 1B2
073
215 Third St. P.O. Box POH IVO
074
705 MacKay St. K8A 1G8
075
30 The Queensway, M 6R 1B5
076
80 Grand Ave. W., P.O. Box 2030, N7M 5L9
077
1030 Ouellette Ave. N9A 1E1
078
50 Charlton Ave. E. L8N 4A6
079
30 Bond St. M5B 1W8

I

Regional/Local H ealth A u th o rity A ffiliation

;

W ebsite

¡wwvv.sbgh.mh.ca/horne.html
¡Winnipeg Regional Health Authority, Winnipeg
¡Parkland Regional Health Authority, Dauphin
■ihtto:/7%'Ww.mareueriteyouviIle.ca/network Wmninegosis.html
¡Winnipeg Regional Health Authority, Winnipeg
¡hirp://www.rnisericordia.mb.ca/index.html
¡Parkland Regional Health Authority, Dauphin
i•■
I
.
'
:
.
1- >. ■
¡Parkland Regional Health Authority, Dauphin
lAutorite de sante regionale de Winnipeg, Winnipeg
¡http://www.mareueritevouville.ca/network FoverVaJade.html.
¡www.holvfamilvhome.mb.ca
¡Winnipeg Regional Health Authority, Winnipeg
¡http://vvww.stamantmb.ca/
¡*
'
¡Winnipeg Regional Health Authority, Winnipeg
¡htto://www.mareueritevouville.ca/network TacheCentre.htmi
;http://www'.margueriteyouvilIe.ca/network StJosephsRes.html
¡Winnipeg Regional Health Authority, Winnipeg
¡Parkland Regional Health Authority, Dauphin
ihttp:/7www.mareueritevouville.ca/network Winnipcgosis.html
¡httD://w\vvv.misericordia.mb.ca/index.hrml
¡Winnipeg Regional Health Authority, Winnipeg
¡Winnipeg Regional Health Authority, Winnipeg
•www.sararielinc.com
•
.
.
'
‘
¡Regie de la sante A, Bathurst
¡Regie de la sante A, Bathurst
:www.beausejour-nb.ca/English/apropos/mdex.cfm?id=98
5www.fndl.org
•Regie de la sante A, Bathurst
i•
;wvvw. m o un tsj.c a
.
j•
ivvww.rocmaura.com
;www. sprilli f. n 1.ca
¡Eastern Health St. John's
.
.
¡Guysborough Antigonish Strait Health Authority #7, Antigonish iwww.gasha.nshealth.ca
.
'
■
:www.svnh.ca
i.
:www.villasaintioseph.com
¡Hamilton Niagrara Haldimand Brant LHIN
wvvw stfosham.on.ca
.
!Champlain LHIN
;www.bmyere.org
¡South East LHIN
:www.providencecare.ca
¡Toronto Central LHIN
:lY>v2vP r9_>jdence.on.ca
'
iNorh West LHIN ,
¡www.sicg.net
¡Waterloo Wellington LHIN
swww.sjhh.guelph.on.ca
, ¡South West LHIN
¡www.sihc.london.on.ca
¡South East LHIN
/
iwww.hoteIdieu.com
¡Waterloo Wellington LHIN
•
iwww.smeh.ca
.
North East LHIN
jhttp://www.mattawahospital.ca/english/home/defau!t.htm
. Champlain LHIN
¡www.pemreghos.org
Toronto Central LHIN
¡www.stioe.on.ca
L ;
.
.
■
.
.
www.ckha.on.ca
ivwvw.hdgh.org
Erie St. Clair LHIN
.
;www. stiosham.on.ca
Hamilton Niagrara Haldimand Brant LHIN
iwww.stmichaelshospital.com
Toronto Central LHIN
NJ

R ef.#
080
081
082
083
, 084
085
086
087

A ddress

i

70 Spine Rd. P5A 1X2
. 288 Grosvenor St. P.O. Box 5777, N6A 4V2

Regional/Local H ealth A uth o rity Affiliation

W ebsite
w w w .sish.ca
www.sihc.london.on.ca

INorth East LHIN
iSouth West LHIN

. . .
■
1335 St. John’s Sideroad E. L4G 0P8
. 500 Church St. L9M 1G 3
iNorth Simcoe Muskoka LHIN
752 King St. W. K7L 4X3
.
ISouth East LHIN ........ ...................................... ........................... ’
580 Algoma St. N. Box 2930, P7B 5G4
North Has: L1IIN
100 West 5th St. P.O. Box 585. L8N 3K 7
¡Hamilton Niagrara Haldimand Brant LHIN
850 HighburyAve. P.O. Box 5532, Stn. B ,N 6A 4H 1

089
090
091
092
093
094
095

541 Glenridge Ave. L2T 4C2
43 Bruyere St. K IN 5C8
56 G overnor's Rd. L9H 5G7
2865 Riverside Dr. K l V 8N5
600 Cecelia St. K8A7Z3
659 Breakey Dr. K9K 2R8
75 Bruyere St. K IN 5C8

097
098
099
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

275 Sydenham St. k7K 1G7
100 Westmount Rd. N1H 5H8

'

1720 Sherwood Forrest Circle, L5K 1R1
9915 Young St. L4C 1VI
1250 South Bay Rd. P3E 6L9
10 Delaware Ave. P.O. Box 1003, L8N 3R1
3276 St. Clair Ave. E .M 1 L 1W1
300 Lillie St. N .,P 7 C 4 Y 7
63 Carrie St. P7A 4J2
99 Wayne Gretzky Pkwy. N3S 6T6
70 Spine Rd. P5A 1X2
21 Grosvenor Street, N6A 1Y6
285 A Memorial Ave. P7B 6H4
2757 King St. E .L 8 G 5 E 4
300 Lillie St. N., P7C 4Y 7
710 Victoria Ave. E. P?C 5P7
111 Water Rd. N. N7T 7G9
90 Stinson St. P.O. Box 1003, L8N 3R1
99 Wayne Gretzky Pkwy. N3S 6T6
667 Sibley Dr. P7B 6Z 8
301 Lillie Street North, P7C 0A6

'

,

Hamilton Niagrara Haldimand Brant LHIN
Champlain LHIN
Hamilton Niagrara Haldimand Brant LHIN
¡Champlain LHIN
Champlain LHIN
¡Central East LHIN
Champlain LHIN
¡Champlain LHIN
iSouth East LHIN
¡Waterloo Wellington LHIN
;Champlain LHIN
•Missisauga Halton LHIN
¡Central LHIN
¡North East LHIN
¡Hamilton Niagraia Haldimand Brant LHIN
¡Toronto Central LHIN
;Norh West LHIN
iNorth East LHIN
;Hamilton Niagrara Haldimand Brant LHIN
¡North East LHIN
iSouth West LHIN
iNorh West LHIN
,
-Hamilton Niagrara Haldimand Brant LHIN
iNorh West LHIN
.
¡North East LHIN
¡Erie St. Clair LHIN
¡Hamilton Niagrara Haldimand Brant LHIN
¡Hamilton Niagrara Haldimand Brant LHIN
iNorh West LHIN
INorth East LHIN

.
..........

j

/

,

www.southdown.on.ca
www.mhcn.on.ca
1
www.providencccare.ca
www.sics.net
www.stjosham.on.ca

www.hoteldieushaver.ors
.
www.bruvere.0r2
www.siv.on.ca
www.stpats.ca
-www.marianhili.ca
www.stioseDhsatilemins.com
www.bruvere.ors
w ww .bruyere.org,
www.providencecare.ca
www.sihh.cuelph.on.ca
www.stiosephscentre.ca
http://sites.eoo2le.com/site/canneIhei2htsca/home
http ://\wv\v.rnariannhomc.ors/
.
www.sisudbuiv.com
www.eoodshcpherdcentres.ca
www.provuience.on.ca
www.sic2.net
www.sics.net
www.sjlc.ca
www.sjgh.ca
wwvv.sjhc.london.on.ca
•
www.sics.net
www.stjosham.on.ca
www.sjcs.net
www.sics.net
www.stiosephshospice.ca
www.goodshepherdcentres.ca/emmanuelhouse.htni
www.silc.ca
www.sice.net
www.sjcs.net

R ef.#
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

A ddress
30 Bond St. M5B 1W8
9 Oakland B lv d .P 5 A 2 T l
3530 Boul. Gouin Est. H1H 1B7
475 rue Houde C.P. 90 J0C 1GO
1870 boul. Pie IX H IV 2C6
216 Ancona St. P.O .Box 280 S0A 0X0
1176 Nicholson Rd. P.O. Box 5000 S4A 0H3
216 Bettez St. Bag 50 S0H 1X0
200 Heritage Dr. P.O. Box 1810 SOA2PO
1702 - 20th St. W. S7M 0Z9
100 - 2nd ave. N.W. S6H IBS
P.O. Box 450 SON 1Z0
777 - 28th st. E. S6V 8C2
P.O.Box 190SOL2C0
4215 Regina Ave. S4S 0J5
216 Bettez St. Bag 50 S0H 1X0
2910 Louise St. S7J 3L8
33 ValensDr. S7L3S2

R egional/Local H ealth A uthority'A ffiliation

•

¡Toronto Central LHIN
¡North East LHIN
j.
¡Region 4 - M auricie et Centre-du-Quebed
■
.
' j.
.
•
;Sun Country Health Region, Weybum
¡Five Hills Health Region, Moose Jaw
¡Sunrise H ealth Region, Yorkton
Saskatoon Health Region, Saskatoon
¡Five Hills Health Region, Moose Jaw
¡Cypress Health Region, Swift Current
¡Prince Albert Parkland Health Region, Prince Albert
¡Regina Qu’Appelle Health Region, Regina

v ..

i
W ebsite
iwww.stmi chael shospi tal.com
¡www.sjah.ca
iwww.hopitaImarie-clarac.qc.ca
i'
.
•
¡www.catholichealth.ca
.
¡www.catholichealth.ca : stioseohsestevan.ca
:www.stiosephshosnitalgravelbourg.com
;www.catholichealth.ca
¡www.catholichealth.ca
¡www.catholichealth.ca
www.catholichealih.ca
ihttD://montstioseph.org/foundation/index.shtml
!i-

-

¡www.catholichealth.ca
i-

¡Saskatoon Health Region, Saskatoon
¡Saskatoon Health Region, Saskatoon

i

tsJ
Ü1

R ef.#
001
002
003
004
006
007
008
009
010
012
013
014
015

018
019
021
022
023
024
025
026
027
028
029
030
031
032
033
034
036
037
038
039

A dditional Comments

:

Primary Care: acute care, continuing care, matemal/child care, outpatient clinics & palliative care; Births (108)
Acute care; Emergency (24hrs); continuing care
■
Continuing care; Medicinc/Surgery; bbstetricts/GynaecoIogy.; Renal care & Dialysis; 24hr emergency care
Emergency; Aacule & Iona-term care; Palliative care; Cancer treatments
•
Acute care; Births (236); Surgery; Obstetrics; Urology; Ultrasound
.
Acute care; Births (5047); Pharmacy; Ultrasound; 24hr emergency
Acute care: Births (2618); Pharmacy; Ultrasound; 24hr emergency
24hr emergency care
Dialysis, Renal care; Elderly; Palliative care; Community day support program
Located at the same site & affiliated with Bonnyville health centre (H ); Long term care & palliative care
Elderly, continuing care, palliative care
Continuing care, palliative care; subacute care

Inform ation Source(s)

GCHF; CHACD; OW
iGCHF; CHACD; OW
IGCHF; CHACD; OW
GCHF; CHACD; OW
;GCHF; CHACD; OW
iGCHF; CHACD; OW
iGCHF; CHACD; OW
GCHF; CHACD; OW
IGCHF; CHACD; OW
IGCHF; CHACD; OW
GCHF; CHACD; OW
iGCHF; CHACD; OW

.

Continuing care, palliative care; rehab (3 6)
assited living
elderly, Long term care

GCHF; CHACD; OW
IGCHF; CHACD; OW
IGCHF; CHACD; OW

Elderly aux, care
,
.
complex continuing care & complex mental health
elderly, physically & mentally disabled ; special needs day services
assited living, continuing care
Retired Obiates o f Mary immaculate priests and brothers
Retirement Home
Acute care; ultrasound; mannography
Births 1740; Emergency room visits: 77,136; numbers are an amalagamtion o f all providence healthcare numbers
..................
Beds:
Obstetrics & Gynaecology (9), Intensive care, Pedeatrics, Medicine/surgeigyjPsychiatry; Births: 560
. ■ .
'
Elderly extended and intermediate care
- .
■.
■
.
Long term care
Located at the same site & affiliated with Holy Family Hospital (H)
Located at the same site & affiliated with Mounth Saint Joseph Hospital (H)

IGCHF; CHACD; OW
OW
IGCHF; CHACD; OW

- ........................................................................................ :...... ..............: .................................................... Long term care
Elderly, multilevel care, alzheimers care
Not listed in the GCHF - long term care home for elderly and retired Religious Sisters
Located at the same site & affiliated with St. Joseph’s General Hospital (H)
Hospice & palliative care
Medicine/Surgery; Paliative Care

f

/

.
'
’

.

IGCHF; CHACD; OW
IGCHF; CHACD; OW
IGCHF; CHACD; OW
IGCHF; CHACD; OW
........-.............. ........ .
.... IGCHF; CHACD; OW
IGCHF; CHACD; OW
;GCHF; CHACD; OW
IGCHF; CHACD
GCHF; CHACD; OW
GCHF; CHACD; OW
iGCHF; CHACD; OW
GCHF; CHACD; OW
iGCHF; CHACD; OW
IGCHF; CHACD; OW
CHACD; OW
GCHF; CHACD; OW
GCHF; CHACD; OW
IGCHF; CHACD

.........

M

ON

R ef.#
040
042
043
045
046
048
050
051
052
053
054
055
056
058
059
060
061
062
063
064
065
066
067
068
069
070
071
072
073
074
075
076
077
078
079

A dditional Comm ents
Cardiology;Geriatric rehab; Intensive care; Medicine;Neonatal intensive care; Obstetrics/Gynaecology: Surgery; 24hr emergency care
Medicine/Surgergy; Pediatrics; 24hr emergency care
24hr urgent care
Elderly
Elderly, physically and mentally handicapped
Elderly
.
.
.
.
.
Elderly, physically and mentally handicapped .
Elderly
.
Developmentaliy disabled
Elderly and physically handicapped
.
Elderly
.
Elderly and physically handicapped
- ..
Mental Health
‘
'
.
.
■
'
Elderly
.
Elderly and physically ¡handicapped *
.
- ■
.
.
.
.
Elderly and physicaUy& mentally handicapped
Nusing & respite care
Intensive care; Medicing/Surgery; Psychiatry; Births (483)
■
Elderly
Elderly & disabled
Home care services
.
Chronic care
.
Continuing Care, palliative care, rehab
Acute care
Complex Chronic care; palliative care; Rehab
Complex continuing care; Rehab; Respite Care
.
.
.
.
Psychiatric and ambulatory care patients
Intensive care: Medicine/Surgery; Ultrasound; X-ray: 24hr emergency
"
f
Chronic care; Medicine/Surgery; pediatrics; 24hr emergency care
1
Intensive care.; Maternity; Pediatrics; Psychiatrics; Surgery; Rehab; Medicine; Births (403)
24hr emergency care .
:
Acute; Chronic Care; Mental Health; Rehab; Women’s and Children’s Health
Intensive care; medicine/Surgery; Mental Health; Cariology; 24hr emergency care & trauma centre
.
Continuing care; medicine; Neonatal intensive care; Obstetrics/Gynaecology; Surgery; Births (3513)
.
. .
,
■■■■■■
•
■

i

•

.

Inform ation Source(s)

GCHF: CHACD; OW
iGCHF; CHACD; OW
iGCHF; CHACD; OW
iGCHF: CHACD
GCIIF; CIIACD
IGCHF; CHACD
GCHF; CHACD; OW
GCHF; CHACD; OW
iGCHF; CHACD; OW
iGCHF; CHACD; OW
iGCHF; CHACD; OW
;GCHF; CHACD; OW
iGCHF; CHACD; OW
!CHACD; OW
GCHF; CHACD
GCHF; CHACD; OW
GCHF; CHACD; OW
GCHF; CHACD; OW
iGCHF; CHACD
GCHF; CHACD; OW
GCHF; CHACD; OW
iGCHF; CHACD; OW
iGCHF: OW
GCHF; CHACD; OW
GCHF; OW; CHAO
GCHF: CHACD; OW; CHAO
GCHF; CHACD; OW
iGCHF; OW; CHAO
iGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
iGCHF; CHACD; OW
iGCHF; CHACD; OW
iGCHF; CHACD; OW
iGCHF; OW
¡GCHF; CHACD; OW; CHCO
iGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
ÌGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
¡GCHF; CHACD; OW
iGCHF; CHACD; OW
IGCHF; OW; CHAO
IGCHF: CHACD; OW; CHAO

Ref. #
080

082
084
085
086
087
088
090
091
092
093
094
095
096
097

100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
112
113
114
115
116
117

Additional Comments

j

Intensive care; Chronic care; Med.Surg: Births 84
■
. ■■
■
Specializes in addressing issues o f addiction and mental health - limited to clergy and the religious (each individual sponsored by a religious community or
diocese)
Psychiatric care
•
Psychiatric, forenzic and mental health
Dementia; Geriatrics; Rehab; Mental health and addictions
.
Formerly Hamilton psychiatric Hospital
Mental Health; formerly known as the London Psychiatric Hospital
.
Mental Health; Formerly known as St. Thomas Psychiatric Hospital
Complex Chronic care; rehabilitation
Rhabilitation; palliative care
Elderly
’
Elderly
'
’
.
Long term care
•
Elderly; physically and developmentally handicapped
Elderly
'
Elserly and physically and developmentally handicapped
Elderly, physically & mentally handicapped
Elderly
.
Elderly
Elderly, mentaly handicaped
<
Elderly, Long term care
Elderly, physically & mentally handicapped, EX-psychiatric & emotionally disturbed
Elderly, physically & cognitively impaired
Elderly,
Long term care
..................
Elderly, physically & mentally handicapped
.
Long term care
nursing care ,
Long term care
Diabetes health and management
Formerly St. Joseph's Community Heaith Centre
,
Counselling
■
Mentai Heatih & addictions
palliative care & terminally ill
Terminally ill; palliative care
Hospice & palliative care
.
Withdrawl management programs; Detox
■
Additions and mental health: eating disorders; 10 youth beds & 30 adult beds

.

.

,

i
r

-

Inform ation Source(s)

GCHF; CHACD; OW; CHCO
iGCHF; CHACD; OW

GCHF; OW
GCIIF; CIIACD; OW; CHAO
GCHF; CHACD; OW
GCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
GCHF; OW; CHAO
GCHF; CHACD; OW
GCHF; CHACD; OW
GCHF; OW; CHAO
GCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
iGCHF; OW; CHAO
¡GCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
GCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
iGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
GCHF: CHACD; OW; CHAO
iGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
iGCHF; CHACD; OW
GCHF; CHACD; OW
GCHF; OW
GCHF; OW
iGCHF: OW; CHAO
iGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
iGCHF; OW
iGCHF; OW; CHAO
- - ..... ....... GCIIF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
iGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
iGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHCO
GCHF; CHACD; OW; CHCO
GCHF; CHACD; OW
iGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
iGCHF; OW; CHAO
iGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
GCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
iGCHF; OW
iGCHF; OW
GCHF; CHACD; OW; CHCO
IGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO
iGCHF; CHACD; OW; CHAO

128

R ef.#
119
120
121
122
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

.

Additional Comments

Detoxification programs
Alcohol and drug treatment; drug vvithdrawl treatment :
■
'
• .■
:
‘
,
Elderly
Elderly
Acute care hospital; 24hr emergency
.
Intensive care; Long term care; Medicine/surgery/pediatrics; Obstetrics/Gynaecology; Births (320); 24hr emergency care
Acute care: 24 hr emergency care
Acute care; Births (6); 24hr emergency care
‘
Intensive care; Surgery; Medicine; Palliative care; Rehab
Long term care; Geriatric Rehabilitation; Day services
.. •
‘
'
Long term care
Long term care; Alzheimer's; palliative care
..................
Elderly,
physically & mentally handicapped, Long term care, palliative care
.
Elderly; Long term care
Long term care ; Same site as Saint Joseph’s hospital - Graavelbourg
Nursing Care
.
Nursing Care
.

I

Inform ation Source(s)

iGCHF; CHACD;
GCHF; OW
■
iGCHF; CHACD;
iGCHF
iGCHF: CIIACD
GCHF; CHACD;
;GCHF; CHACD;
GCHF; CHACD;
GCHF; CHACD;
ÌGCHF; CHACD;
iGCHF; CHACD;
iGCHF; CHACD;
•
■iGCHF; CHACD;
....... ........... — ......—... GCHF; CH ACD
GCHF; CHACD
iGCHF; CHACD;
iGCHF; CHACD;
GCHF; CHACD

OW; CHAO
OW

OW
OW
OW
OW
OW
OW
OW
OW
......
OW
OW

